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Abstract
A striking characteristic o f  episodic memory is that memory is better for pictures 
than words—the picture superiority effect (Paivio, 1971). While evidence in support of 
past explanations (e.g., dual-coding and sensory semantic models) has been inconsistent, 
a growing body o f behavioural (e.g.. Potter & Faulconer, 1975; Smith & Magee, 1980) 
and neurological (Grady et al., 1998) evidence points to superior processing o f meaning, 
which is generally associated with pictorial presentations, as a major source o f the 
pictorial superiority effect The results of the present study—which manipulated meaning 
processing at study (congruent/incongruent meaning questions vs. no questions) and 
study/test form (picture or word at study crossed with picture or word at test)—revealed 
that when potential ceiling problems o f previous studies (e.g., Durso & Johnson, 1980; 
Emmerich & Ackerman, 1979) are controlled, meaning elaboration 1) reduces, but does 
not eliminate, picture superiority in Yes/No Recognition responses, 2) does not affect the 
advantage o f pictures over words in Remember (e.g., Tulving, 1985) responses but may 
affect Know responses, and 3) does not affect the advantage of pictures over words in 
Source Memory (e.g., Durso & Johnson, 1980) responses. Moreover, because the 
benefits of reinstating the study form at test were as large for words as for pictures—for 
recognition, remember, and source responses—the results imply that the processing of 
pictures caimot be treated as including processing in common with words with the 
addition of picture specific processing. Rather, the processing o f  pictures and words 
must result in equally unique sources of information that differ in terms of their overall 
memorability.
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Accounting For Picture Superiority 1
The picture superiority effect (Paivio, 1971)—the finding that pictures are 
remembered better than words—is one o f the most robust phenomena in psychology and 
has puzzled researchers for over one hundred years (for review see Kinjo & Snodgrass, 
2000; Kobayashi, 1986). It has primarily been observed on tests o f  episodic or explicit 
memory; that is, tests that require intentional recollection (Tulving, 1972; 1983; 1993). 
For example, numerous controlled laboratory experiments have found that when subjects 
try to recall or identify previously studied pictures and words, memory performance is 
consistently better for pictures (Weldon & Coyote, 1996). While the reason for the effect 
is still under active debate (e.g., Kinjo & Snodgrass, 2000; Mintzer & Snodgrass, 1999; 
Vaidya & Gabrieli, 2000; Weldon & Coyote, 1996), it has been suggested that pictures 
elicit greater elaboration o f meaning than words, thus providing a "richer" or "stronger" 
memory trace at test (e.g., Durso & Johnson, 1979; 1980; Potter & Faulconer, 1975;
Smith & Magee, 1980). Before describing an experiment in which this assumption is 
tested, the following paragraphs will present a brief overview o f episodic memory, and 
discuss how factors that manipulate elaboration o f meaning affect episodic memory.
Take a moment to think about what type of information is required to remember a 
specific event in your life; for example, the details surrounding your high school 
graduation. On the one hand, you would need to recall information specific to the event 
itself, such as what time o f year it was. To do this you might want to, for example, think 
o f  how cold it was at the time, or whether or not there was snow on the ground. On the 
other hand, in order to recall and make sense o f this specific information, you also need 
to have general knowledge about the world, such as the relationship between 
weather/temperature and time o f year. In other words, to remember autobiographical
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events in one’s life, one must retrieve and relate both specific information and general 
knowledge.
According to the framework developed by Tulving (1972; 1983; 1993), memory 
for general knowledge and specific events represent separate, but interdependent, 
memory systems: semantic and episodic memory, respectively. These memory systems 
serve to acquire, retain, and retrieve external information (Tulving 1984; 1985a).
Semantic memory is composed o f basic facts, ideas, rules and concepts (e.g., one’s 
knowledge o f the relationship between temperature and time o f year) that are the basis o f 
an individual’s general knowledge o f the world. In contrast, episodic memory refers to 
autobiographical events that an individual has experienced in the past; it contains 
knowledge o f specific earlier experiences and the circumstances that surrounded them 
(e.g., when and where they occurred). Thus, unlike semantic memory, episodic memory 
codes for specific spatial locations and temporal organizations (Tulving, 1993).
Considering the complexity o f spatial-temporal coding, and the similarity between 
the details o f various life experiences, one would expect a lot o f associative interference 
in episodic memory. For example, a person might confuse the details o f his high school 
graduation with, say, those o f his wedding. Tulving (1993) and others (e.g., Hayman, 
MacDonald, & Tulving, 1993; Metcalfe, Cottrell, & M end, 1992) hypothesize that, to 
deal with this complexity, episodic memory provides for the rapid cognitive binding of 
novel information. In other words, to avoid confusion between events composed o f 
similar parts, episodic memory encodes components o f each event interactively. That is, 
episodic memory represents information fiom an event in terms o f the interrelations 
among the parts or components o f semantic memory comprising that event. In this way.
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representations o f similar events can be stored and accessed as distinct units in episodic 
memory.
Evidence o f  interactive encoding in episodic memory can be obtained by studying 
how the encoding o f different types o f information affects episodic memory performance. 
For example, according to Hayman, Servais and MacDonald (1999), one consequence of 
interactive encoding is that any increase in memory for the whole episode should also 
increase memory for any o f  its parts. That is, if episodic memory requires retrieval from 
an interactively encoded representation o f a prior event, one would expect a positive 
relation between different types o f memory for the same event, even when very different 
types o f information are tested. For example, in the case o f word memory, encoding both 
meaning (e.g., word definition) and sensory characteristics (e.g., case, riiyme or 
phonemic properties) should result in greater memorability for both types o f information 
(on tests that emphasize memory for meaning and those that emphasize memory for 
sensory characteristics).
Superficially, this prediction is inconsistent with those o f well-established theories 
o f  human memory. For example, both the levels o f processing (Craik & Lockhart, 1972) 
and transfer appropriate processing (Morris, Bransford & Franks, 1977) approaches treat 
sensory and meaning information as if  they are mutually exclusive*. That is, despite the 
fact that individuals are likely to encode both meaning and sensory characteristics in 
everyday life, both approaches focus on how memory performance is affected by the 
exclusive encoding o f meaning or sensory characteristics; neither theory addresses how 
memory performance might be affected by interactive encoding. In fact, both imply that 
meaning and sensory information function independently to influence memory (Hayman
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& Rickards, 1995). Furthermore, advocates o f these theories often assume that 
processing information about meaning characteristics is irrelevant when the memory task 
requires the retention o f  “shallow” or sensory information (Hayman, et al., 1999). For 
example, Eysenck and Keane, in describing a rhyming test (which requires the 
identification o f words rhyming with list words), stated; “What is required for this kind o f 
test is shallow...information” (1990, p. 154).
Reflecting this “either/or” mentality is the primary method used in experiments 
investigating levels o f processing and transfer ^propriate approaches: the single­
question design (Hayman et al., 1999). In this approach, to-be-remembered items are 
studied exclusively in one o f two processing conditions. That is, a single orienting 
question which emphasizes either meaning or sensory information is presented, thus 
leading subjects to engage exclusively in meaning or sensory-based processing. For 
example, in an experiment that supported levels o f processing, Craik and Tulving (1975) 
had subjects either visualize whether a word would fit in a sentence (meaning processing) 
or attend to typescript (sensory-based processing). They found that meaning (“deep”) 
encoding resulted in better memory than sensory-based (“shallow”) encoding. Similarly, 
in an experiment testing the transfer appropriate processing approach, Stein (1978) had
subjects read questions emphasizing meaning (e.g., “_________has a steel blade?”) or
sensory (e.g., “_________has a capital‘T ’?”) information prior to the visual presentation
of a target word (e.g., “knife”). A crossover interaction was found between type o f 
processing at study and test: case processing at study resulted in better case recognition 
than meaning processing at study, and vice versa.
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Recent studies continue to use the single-question design in studying patterns o f 
memory variability resulting from the encoding o f  meaning and sensory-based 
information. For example, Marks (1991), who examined the effect o f different visual 
orienting tasks on the retention o f pictures’ names and pictorial details, had subjects 
encode pictures in terms of questions about category (meaning processing) or distinct 
physical characteristics (sensory-based processing). In support o f transfer appropriate 
processing, recognition of picture names and picture details was superior after meaning 
and sensory-based processing, respectively. Again, contradicting the notions based on 
interactive encoding, Marks concluded that “conceptually driven [meaning] processing 
does not facilitate transfer on more data-driven [sensory-based] tests of recognition that 
emphasize...visual details” (p. 575).
According to Hayman et al. (1999) however, the design used in the above 
experiments is limited because it confounds necessary information with sufficient 
information. For the purpose o f isolating information that is critical for a task, the single­
question design requires that subjects either encode meaning or sensory characteristics. 
However, while information may be necessary for a task, it may not be sufficient. For 
example, processing the sensory characteristics o f  an item may be necessary for 
subsequent recall/recognition o f these physical characteristics, but processing o f meaning 
may be important in the likelihood o f  storage and retrieval of a distinctive memory o f the 
event. In this way, attending to one type o f information could aid in the retention o f 
other, seemingly unrelated, types. However, only by crossing the processing o f meaning 
and sensory features at study can one assess whether or not semantic processing at study
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modulates memory for surface information (i.e., subjects must encode to-be-remembered 
information in a sensory and a meaning context simultaneously).
This was done in a series o f experiments by Hayman and colleagues (Cribbie, 
1995; Hayman and Cribbie, 1998; Hayman and Rickards, 1995; Hayman et al., 1999) 
using a dual-question design. Target items were studied following the presentation of 
two concurrent orienting questions: one concerning meaning and one concerning sensory 
information. Recall that Stein (1978), using a single-question design, had subjects read
questions emphasizing meaning (e.g., “_________has a steel blade?”) or sensory (e.g.,
“________ has a capital “1”?”) information prior to the visual presentation o f a target
word (e.g., “knife”). In contrast, Hayman et al. (1999) presented target words such as 
“knife” with both a sensory question that was congruent (e.g., “has a capital‘T ’?”) or 
incongruent (e.g., “has a capital “F”?”) and a meaning question that was congruent (e.g., 
“has a steel blade?”) or incongruent (e.g., “is a venomous animal?”). In contrast to 
Stein’s finding that case processing at study resulted in better memory for sensory 
features (i.e., case recognition) than meaning processing at study, and vice versa 
(supporting transfer appropriate processing), Hayman et al. (1999) found that case 
recognition was higher following congruent case/congruent meaning than congruent 
case/incongruent meaning study processing.
The results of Hayman et al.’s (1999) experiment (as well as those o f Hayman and 
Cribbie, 1998, who replicated these findings using pictures) therefore, support the idea 
that a fundamental property of episodic memory is the interactive encoding o f situational 
information. Since a memory trace is an interdependent juxtaposition o f  connections 
between various states o f semantic knowledge, increases in memory for an episode will
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also increase memory for each o f its parts—even information that is seemingly unrelated 
to these “parts” (in this case, meaning- versus sensory-based information) (Hayman & 
Rickards, 1995; Hayman et al., 1999). Thus, instead o f  sensory features being “separate” 
from meaning (as implied by the levels o f processing ^proach) or relevant only for 
certain tasks (as is implied by transfer appropriate processing), interactive encoding 
predicts that encoding both sensory features and meaning information can result in 
greater memorability for both types of information.
Generation and Realitv Monitoring Effects
In another series o f studies, Hayman and Dew (1997) demonstrated that an 
interactive encoding framework might help accoimt for variability in other examples o f 
episodic memory seen 'm. generation effects (cf. Slamecka & Graf, 1978) and reality 
monitoring (cf. Johnson, & Raye, 1981). Both of these phenomena refer to the widely- 
reported memory advantage o f self-generated (obtained through internal processes such 
as reasoning, imagination, and thought) versus perceived information (obtained through 
perceptual processes, such as reading) (Hayman & Dew, 1997).
In the prototypical experiment demonstrating the generation effect (e.g., Slamecka 
& Graf, 1978), subjects were given a rule, a cue word, and the initial letter o f  a target 
word response. They were then required to self-generate the target response (e.g., with
the antonym rule, subjects were given the word-letter pair, “future-P ” or cues for the
target word PAST). Performance is compared with instances where subjects simply read 
the target word following a rule (e.g., “antonym: future-P AST”). When memory for the 
target word is tested, generated words are recalled or recognized better than perceived 
words (i.e., those that are read).
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Studies have also shown that self-generation leads to better memory for the origin 
o f  an event (i.e., whether it was imagined or perceived), a phenomenon dubbed, the 
“reality monitoring effect” For example, in an experiment by Johnson, Raye, Foley, and 
Foley (1981), subjects were either given a first-letter cue in the context o f a category
name (e.g., animal - D ) and asked to generate the target (DOG) or they heard the
category name spoken by the experimenter. It was found that subjects who self­
generated identified the origin o f  the target word DOG better than when they heard 
“animal - DOG” spoken.
A number o f explanations have been proposed to accoimt for the memory 
advantage of self-generated information. Johnson et al. (1981) attribute the reality 
monitoring effect to “special memories” about cognitive operations. That is, they 
hypothesize that the effort required for self-generation results in a greater amount of 
information about cognitive operations, and such operations can serve as a discriminative 
cue about the origin o f memories. Slamecka and Katsaiti (1987) argue, however, that 
although response generation may be a more difficult task, there is no reason to expect 
that such cognitive operations will result in better memory. In spite o f their “superficial 
distinctiveness,” generate and read processing are functionally the same, and the so- 
called “generation effect” is simply due to differential rehearsal as a  function o f task 
demands. Specifically, because studies investigating generation effects typically use 
mixed-list designs (i.e., generate and read items are intermixed into the same study list), 
subjects are drawn to engage in selective displaced rehearsal o f the “generate” items 
(because of their “cryptic” and “fragmentary” îqipearance). This study-time imbalance 
results in an apparent generation effect. In support o f their theory, Slamecka and Katsaiti
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found that the effect dis^pears when a between-list design (i.e., subjects are placed 
either in a “generate” or “read” condition) is used.
Begg, Snider, Foley, and Goddard (1989), however, argue that selective rehearsal 
is not a “general explanation” o f generation effects. First, it is inconsistent with many 
laboratory findings. For example, Watkins and Sechler (1988) found a much larger 
generation effect under incidental memory conditions than under intentional conditions, 
even though one would expect the effect o f selective rehearsal to be greater in the latter 
condition. Furthermore, between-subjects generation effects have been reported in tests 
o f  recognition (e.g., Slamecka & Graf, 1978). Secondly, Slamecka and Katsaiti fail to 
fully explain how strategic processes function to produce a generation effect (e.g., how 
does a “cryptic appearance” encourage rehearsal?).
Elaboration o f  M eaning
In contrast to the above explanations, it can be argued that (self) generation 
effects are a  result o f elaboration o f meaning. The basis o f this position is that the 
meaning o f a concept is specified in the cognitive space by the intersection o f a set o f 
relevant dimensions (Klein & Saltz, 1976). Memory performance will depend on the 
extent to which relevant dimensions are activated during learning. In terms o f the present 
discussion, generating an item may provide a structure which increases the likelihood that 
the target word is related to other information, thus providing a richer mnemonic basis for 
recognition/recall (the generation effect) and—via cognitive binding inherent in episodic 
memory—better linked memories for subsequent identification of study origin (the reality 
monitoring effect).
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Hayman and Dew (1997), working within an interactive encoding framework, 
provide strong evidence of such a result. In their experiments, subjects self-generated a
word response to a Ayme-cue word and a 2-letter stem (e.g., fast-PA ) or perceived a
response in a cue-target pair (e.g., fast-PAST). To test the effect o f elaboration o f 
meaning, the experimental group also received a meaning-based orienting question that 
was congruent (e.g., opposite o f future) or incongruent (e.g., opposite o f bright) with the 
target response (e.g., PAST). Hayman and Dew found that congruent questions increased 
recognition and reality monitoring accuracy (i.e., identifying the origin o f the study 
words as “read” or “solved”) for perceived responses to that o f self-generated responses.
In contrast, incongruent questions decreased performance for self-generated responses to 
the level o f perceived responses. The results showed that 1) encouraging meaning 
elaboration (via congruent meaning-based questions) facilitated reality monitoring and 
recognition as much as the self-generation o f  information, and 2) disrupting meaning 
elaboration (via the presentation of incongruent meaning-based questions) negated any 
potential advantage o f self-generation.
Hayman and Dew (1997) concluded that their results supported the interactive 
encoding approach. That is, as predicted by interactive encoding, a manipulation that 
increased the overall availability of an episode (i.e., elaboration o f meaning) improved 
memory for a separate component of the episode (i.e., reality monitoring, a task which 
depends primarily on the availability o ï sensory features) (see Johnson & Raye, 1981; 
Marks, 1991). In addition, Hayman and Dew’s results suggest that greater meaning 
elaboration during self-generation tasks underlies the facilitation observed in both the 
reality monitoring and the generation effects. That is, rather than being due to “special
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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memories” (Johnson et al., 1981) or selective displaced rehearsal (Slamecka & Katsaiti, 
1987), facilitation from imagine (generate) processing at study is thought to reflect 
greater attention to meaning, which provides a richer cognitive frameworic for binding in 
episodic memory.
The Picture Superioritv Effect
The success o f Hayman and Dew (1997) in accounting for the memory advantage 
o f (selQ generation raises the possibility that differences in meaning elaboration could 
also account for other examples o f unexplained episodic memory variability. For 
example, the picture superiority effect (Paivio, 1971)—the finding that pictures are 
remembered better than words on tests o f free recall and recognition—has been 
investigated in numerous studies (e.g., Bajo, 1988; D ’Agostino, O’Neill, & Paivio, 1977; 
Durso & Johnson, 1979, 1980; Intraub & Nicklos, 1985; Job, Rumiati, & Lotto, 1992; 
Kinjo & Snodgrass, 2000; Kobayashi, 1986; Madigan, 1983; Mintzer & Snodgrass, 1999; 
Nelson, 1979; Nelson, Reed, & McEvoy, 1977a; 1977b; Nelson, Reed & Walling, 1976; 
Paivio, 1971, 1986, 1991; Paivio & Csapo, 1973; Ritchey, 1980; Smith & Magee, 1980; 
Snodgrass & McLure, 1975; Vaidya & Gabrieli, 2000; Weldon & Coyote, 1996). 
However, reasons for the effect are still unclear.
One o f the earliest explanations for the picture superiority effect was Paivio’s 
(1971; 1986; 1991) dual-coding hypothesis. Paivio proposed that imaginai and verbal 
representations are stored in functionally independent, but interconnected, systems in 
long term memory. Because encoding redundancy presumably improves memorability, 
Paivio suggested that events represented with both codes are more likely to be 
remembered than events represented with a single code. Regarding the picture
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superiority effect, Paivio argued that individuals are more likely to spontaneously name 
pictures than to imagine word referents (i.e., pictures are more likely to be dually 
encoded). Thus, they are remembered better than words. Support for the theory is 
provided by Paivio and C s^ o  (1973), who investigated the relative contributions o f 
imaginai and verbal codes in picture/word memory. Using orienting tasks which required 
subjects to encode stimuli either verbally (by writing or pronoimcing the words and 
picture labels) or imaginally (by drawing or imagining the pictures and labels), they 
found that recall for pictures was better than words under all conditions except when 
subjects imaged words. That is, when subjects were led to dually encode words, their 
memory for words was equal to that o f pictures.
An alternative explanation of the picture superiority effect was provided by 
Nelson (1979). His sensory-semantic model implicates the role o f  stimulus surface 
features in superior picture memory; that is, pictures provide more distinctive visual 
representations than do words, thus providing a more differentiating mnemonic than the 
sensory representation provided by its label. This explanation is supported by evidence 
that high visual similarity among pictures eliminates or reverses the picture superiority 
effect (Nelson et al., 1976).
While there is some support for both the dual-coding and sensory-semantic 
approaches, both theories have been challenged by contradictory findings. For example, 
contrary to Paivio’s (1971) hypothesis that verbally labeling pictures results in a stronger 
memory trace (because o f dual-coding), Intraub (1979), in an investigation o f implicit 
naming in pictorial encoding, found no correlation between naming latency and memory. 
Job et al. (1992), on the other hand, reported evidence contradicting Nelson’s (1979)
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sensory-semantic model. They found that categorization o f pictures and  words was 
slower when the to-be-categorized stimuli were from two visually similar categories (i.e., 
fruits-vegetables pictures/words) than from visually dissimilar categories (i.e., fruits- 
weapons pictures/words). Based on this result. Job et al. argued that the picture 
superiority effect in categorization is not due to the distinctive sensory features o f 
pictures over words. Instead, they suggested that their results could be explained most 
parsimoniously with reference to the effect of semantic (rather than visual) similarity.
This explanation is consistent with theoretical orientations which stress the 
importance of meaning processing (rather than sensory-based processing, e.g.. Nelson, 
1979; Paivio, 1971) in producing the picture superiority effect. This viewpoint is based 
on findings that pictures access meaning information more readily than do words 
(Weldon & Coyote, 1996). For example. Potter and Faulconer (1975) found that naming 
a pictured object (which requires phonemic or sensory information) took much longer 
than naming a word, but deciding whether an object was in a given category (which 
requires meaning information) took less time for pictures than words—a finding which 
was replicated by Pellegrino, Rosinski, Chiesi, & Siegel (1977). Similarly, Smith and 
Magee (1980) observed that word categorization was disrupted by the presence o f  a 
picture from an incongruent category, but picture categorization was not disrupted by a 
category-incongruent word. Based on this result, they suggested that meaning is accessed 
faster fiom pictures than words, since the incompatible information fiom the distractor 
would interfere only if that information were available prior to the production o f the 
target response. Providing more evidence that pictures are more likely to access 
meaning. Nelson et al. (1977a), using a serial learning task, found that high semantic
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similarity (e.g., all stimuli were animals) disrupted the learning of pictures (i.e., 
eliminated the typical picture superiority effect) but not words.
Further evidence that pictures access meaning more readily than words is 
provided by studies in which orienting tasks have been used. For example, numerous 
studies have found that semantic orienting tasks yield better recognition and recall for 
words (e.g., Craik & Tulving, 1975; Geis & Hall, 1976; Hyde & Jenkins, 1973; 
Moscovitch & Craik, 1976) but not for pictures (e.g., D’Agostino et al., 1977; Durso & 
Johnson, 1980; Emmerich & Ackerman, 1979; Intraub & Nicklos, 1985). Intraub and 
Nicklos argue that meaning elaboration is not an automatic process for words, and tasks 
that encourage attention to richer meaning will improve word memory. Semantic 
processing o f pictures, on the other hand, may be redundant with automatically initiated 
processes, resulting in little memory change.
Evidence for the actual “source” of these “automatically initiated” processes is 
provided by data from neuroimaging studies, which have revealed differences in the 
functional neuroanatomy for picture and word memory. Results from these studies 
suggest that pictures and words employ similar brain resources during semantic, but not 
nonsemantic, encoding. For example, Grady, McIntosh, Rajah & Craik (1998) found that 
picture encoding resulted in more extrastriate cortex and medial temporal cortex 
activation than word encoding under “neutral” conditions (see also Menard, Kosslyn, 
Thomson, Alpert, & Rauch, 1996; Nyberg, 1999). However, when pictures and words 
were presented with semantic orienting questions (which presumably encouraged similar 
levels o f picture/word meaning elaboration), no picture/word differences in medial 
temporal cortex activation were found (Grady et al., 1998).
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Grady et al. (1998) noted that the extrastriate cortex is generally activated during 
visual perception of both verbal and nonverbal material (cf. Haxby, Grady, Horwitz, 
Ungerleider, Mishkin, Carson, Herscovitch, Schs^iro, & Rapoport, 1991; Peterson, Fox, 
Snyder & Raichle, 1990; Zeki, Watson, Lueck, Friston, Kennard, & Frackowiak, 1991) 
and was probably more active during picture encoding in their experiment because the 
pictures used were more visually complex than the words. The medial temporal cortex, 
on the other hand, has long been known from lesion experiments to be important for 
episodic memory (Aggleton, Hunt, & Rawlins, 1986; Mishkin, 1978; Scoville & Milner, 
1957; Sutherland & McDonald, 1990), and may be particularly important for encoding 
new information (Squire, 1992). The presence o f differential activation in this area 
during picture/word processing suggests that it may also be the “source” o f picture 
superiority. Furthermore, the fact that this differential activation disappeared during 
semantic encoding suggests that meaning elaboration may be the mechanism underlying 
the effect, and conditions that equate picture/word meaning elaboration may also equate 
picture/word memory. Indeed, the behavioural results o f Grady et al.’s study support this 
hypothesis; performance on recognition tests showed similar levels o f incidental memory 
for pictures and words (i.e., a reduction of the picture superiority effect) following 
semantic processing, but not nonsemantic processing (which showed the usual picture 
superiority effect).
Methodological Problems o f Past Studies
While Grady et al. (1998) found that picture/word memory was similar following 
meaning elaboration, they could not make strong conclusions regarding this trend 
because they only tested enough subjects to achieve statistically significant neurological
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Accounting For Picture Superiority 16
(rather than behavioural) results. Unfortunately, other studies examining the effect o f 
meaning elaboration (via orienting questions) on picture/word memory have also been 
inconclusive due to methodological limitations. For example, Emmerich and Ackerman
(1979), tested picture/word recognition and response latencies following “acoustic” (e.g., 
“Does it rhyme with kale?” for NAIL), “schematic” (e.g., “Is it round?” for SUN), and 
“conceptual” (e.g., “Does it unlock things?” for KEY) orienting questions. While their 
results showed a trend towards equivalent picture/word memory performance (i.e., an 
elimination o f the picture superiority effect) following conceptual questions (rather than 
acoustic and schematic questions), they only reported analyses for their response latency 
data because o f near ceiling levels o f recognition performance (i.e., nearly all pictures 
and words were recognized at test). The fact that ceiling effects were present for pictures 
and words in the “conceptual” questions condition (91% and 93% recognition for pictures 
and words, respectively), but only for pictures in the control condition (90% recognition, 
as compared to 82% for words), suggests that additional benefit to pictures due to 
meaning elaboration in the “conceptual” questions condition was not detected.
Therefore, Emmerich and Ackerman could not conclude that meaning elaboration 
eliminated the picture superiority effect in their experiment.
Other studies have found that meaning elaboration appeared to eliminate the 
picture superiority effect, but methodological problems have left open the possibility that 
results were due to confounding variables. For example, D’Agostino et al. (1977), who 
examined picture/word recall following the presentation structural, phonemic, and 
semantic orienting tasks, obtained significant results which were somewhat contradictory 
to the present hypothesis: Semantic and phonemic processing produced equivalent
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Accounting For Picture Superiority 17
picture/word recall performance. However, as Durso and Johnson (1980) argue, 
D’Agostino et al.’s experiment was flawed because the test stimuli and orienting 
questions were presented twice. Repetition of the concepts would tend to benefit the 
weaker trace relative to the stronger one and could have resulted in equivalent recall, not 
because picture and word traces were similar, rather, because words accrued the benefits 
o f repetition more rapidly (cf. Durso & Johnson, 1979).
In an attempt to correct the confound in D’Agostino et al.’s (1977) experiment, 
Durso and Johnson (1980) conducted a study examining picture/word recognition 
following single-presentations o f “referential”, “imaginai” and “verbal” orienting tasks 
(which emphasized semantic, visual, and phonemic information, respectively). They 
reported an elimination o f the picture superiority effect in recognition following 
presentations of “function” questions (i.e., “What is the object used for?”), and a reversal 
o f the picture superiority effect (i.e., a word superiority effect) following presentations o f 
“explicit imagery” questions (i.e., “Create an image”). However, in addition to the 
presence o f ceiling effects in the above conditions (mean recognition o f 93% for pictures 
and words), Durso and Johnson’s (1980) experiment contained another critical confound: 
the absence o f a control for study/test form interactions (i.e., they tested recognition of 
studied pictures and words at study using only aurally-presented words). Such a 
procedure is problematic for two reasons. First, absence o f  a test form manipulation 
limits the detection o f picture/word memory differences to study only (i.e., picture/word 
differences in both encoding and retrieval processes cannot be assessed). Several 
researchers have argued that retrieval processes are often neglected in studies o f the 
picture superiority effect, despite recent data suggesting that they play an important role
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(e.g., Mintzer & Snodgrass, 1999; Nicolas, 1995; Sternberg, Radeborg, & Hedman, 1995; 
Weldon & Coyote, 1996; Wippich, Melzer, & Mecklenbrauker, 1998).
Second, and more importantly, one of psychology’s most consistent findings is 
that, as dictated by the encoding specificity (Tulving & Thomson, 1973) and transfer 
appropriate processing (Morris et al., 1977; Weldon, Roediger & Challis, 1989) theories, 
memory is better when there is a match between cues at study and test. In studies like 
Durso and Johnson’s (1980), pictures at study are being tested with a different form of 
test stimuli, while words at study are tested with the same form o f  test stimuli. Therefore, 
this procedure theoretically presents a bias favouring word (rather than picture) retrieval.
Direct evidence supporting this possibility is provided by studies which have 
measured the effect o f changing stimulus form (picture or word) between study and test. 
For example, Sternberg, et al. (1995), in a study investigating the effect o f form-changing 
on recognition memory reaction time (RT), found that a larger decrement in performance 
was obtained when pictures were studied as words than when words were studied as 
pictures (i.e., there were larger “form-change costs” for pictures than words). Mintzer 
and Snodgrass (1999) replicated this finding in an experiment testing recognition 
memory. These studies suggest that Durso and Johnson’s design could have eliminated 
picture superiority with or without meaning elaboration. As Mintzer and Snodgrass 
suggest, “the advantage of the same form word-word item over the different form picture- 
word item could be counteracted by the advantage of a picture at study over a word at 
study, producing approximately equal performance for the word-word and picture-word 
items” (p. 122). This is precisely the result that Durso and Johnson obtained.
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The above analysis may also ^ p ly  to studies that show a reduction, elimination, 
or reversal o f the picture superiority effect following meaning elaboration in recall 
(D’Agostino et al., 1977; Durso & Johnson, 1980). For example, Durso and Johnson
(1980) found that “referential” and “imaginai” orienting questions also eliminated the 
picture superiority effect in recall. However, recall tests can also present a study/test 
form interaction that might counteract the picture superiority effect because it involves 
the self-generation of retrieval cues. Specifically, if  one is inclined to self-generate 
verbal rather than pictorial cues, there would be a match between encoding and retrieval 
cues for words rather than pictures that would coimteract picture superiority in a manner 
similar to the word-word condition of a recognition test.
Another weakness o f past studies examining the effect of meaning elaboration on 
picture/word memory is their failure to measure memory following the presentation of 
semantically incongruent orienting tasks. Recall that Hayman and Dew (1997), in their 
examination o f self-generation effects, found that disrupting meaning elaboration (via the 
presentation o f incongruent meaning-based orienting questions) negated any potential 
advantage o f self-generation. Analogously, if  superior meaning elaboration is the reason 
for the picture superiority effect, one would expect that manipulations which disrupt such 
meaning elaboration would also reduce this picture/word memory difference. While 
Hayman and Cribbie (1998) reported that incongruent meaning questions did result in 
poorer memory for pictures than congruent meaning questions, to our knowledge, no 
such manipulation has ever been conducted in the context of comparing picture and word 
memory. Comparisons of picture/word memory under congruent meaning, incongruent 
meaning and control conditions would presumably shed much light on the current debate.
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Future studies investigating the effect o f  meaning elaboration on the picture 
superiority effect would also be better served by using materials that are thoroughly 
evaluated and normed. Past studies have used pictures that were hand drawn by the 
authors using a felt tip pen and not extensively judged for name or image agreement (e.g., 
Durso & Johnson, 1980; Emmerich & Ackerman, 1979). It is therefore possible that they 
were less recognizable or led to smaller picture superiority effects. A smaller picture 
superiority effect would, in turn, be more easily masked or hidden by other effects, such 
as the study/test form interaction discussed earlier.
In summary therefore, the debate is still open as to whether elaboration o f 
meaning can eliminate the picture superiority effect and, more importantly, whether 
differences in meaning elaboration, on the whole, can account for picture/word memory 
differences. Studies investigating the former question using implicit tests of memory 
have also been conducted. Evidence supporting (e.g., Nicholas, 1995; Weldon &
Roediger, 1987; Weldon, Roediger, & Challis, 1989; Wippich et al., 1998) and negating 
(e.g., Weldon & Coyote, 1996) the hypothesis have been found. While these studies are 
interesting, results using implicit tests o f memory lie outside our domain o f interest for 
two reasons. First, numerous variables have been found to influence explicit but not 
implicit memory performance, such as levels o f processing (Graf & Mandler, 1984;
Jacoby & Dallas, 1981), generation versus read study conditions (Gardiner, 1988b), 
divided versus undivided attention (Parkin, Reid, & Russo, 1990), and intentional versus 
incidental learning (Greene, 1986). Because o f the apparent differences between explicit 
and implicit memory, direct comparison of results based on them is unwise. Secondly, 
we are interested in what our results suggest about the nature of episodic memory. As
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Tulving (1983) asserted: “In theories o f episodic memory, recollective experience should 
be the ultimate object o f interest, the central aspect o f remembering that is to be 
explained and imderstood” (p. 184). Implicit memory tests, in contrast, are by definition, 
those in which the “conscious recollection o f  prior events and experiences is not 
required” (p. 617) (Gardiner, 1988a), and thus are incompatible with the focus o f  our 
study.
Remember/Know Tests o f Memory
Consistent with our focus on recollective experience, the present study will also 
make use o f a technique suggested by Tulving (1985b) for measuring the nature o f 
subjects’ conscious awareness during tests o f  memory. Tulving (1985b) described 
experiments in which subjects were required to put an “R” (for “remember”) next to 
items in the test whose prior occurrence in the study list they could consciously recollect, 
and a “K” (for “know”) next to items they recalled or recognized on some other basis. 
Within Tulving’s framework (1983, 1985a, 1985b), “remember” responses reflect output 
from episodic memory, because recollective (or autonoetic) consciousness is a defining 
characteristic o f that system. A “know” response (or noetic consciousness), on the other 
hand, is characteristic of semantic memory, because knowledge retrieved from semantic 
memory is not normally accompanied by recollective experience (Gardiner & Java, 1991; 
1993; Rajaram, 1993; 1996). This conceptualization is supported by evidence suggesting 
a dissociation between remember/know phenomena—similar to dissociations observed in 
studies that have manipulated conscious awareness by comparing performance in explicit 
and implicit memory tests (Gardiner, 1988a). For example, variables such as levels o f  
processing and generate-versus-read study conditions (Gardiner, 1998a), divided-versus-
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undivided attention (Gardiner & Parkin, 1990), and intentional-versus-incidental learning 
(Macken & Hampson, 1991) have been found to be influenced by “remember,” but not 
“know,” responses. Remember/know recognition tests therefore, are a useful addition to 
studies investigating principled outcomes o f episodic memory manipulations.
Present Studv
The purpose o f the present study was 1) to examine the extent that differences in 
meaning elaboration during study accoimts for differences in picture/word memory, and 
2) to investigate interactive encoding in incidental episodic memory. Memory for 
pictures and words was assessed in two instruction groups: a no questions group that 
viewed pictures and words under neutral conditions (i.e., following the presentation o f  a 
series o f“*” symbols), and a questions group that was required to answer 
congruent/incongruent questions about the meaning of the presented stimuli. To avoid 
the limitations o f  past studies, our experimental design included, in addition to the 
manipulation o f meaning processing at study (congruent/incongruent questions versus no 
questions), a 1) factorial manipulation o f  study and test form (picture or word), 2) a filler 
task and several recency buffers, presented between the study and test conditions, to 
avoid ceiling effects, and 3) picture and word materials taken fi’om Snodgrass & 
Vanderwart (1980), which have been thoroughly normed and standardized. Memory was 
measured using a remember/know test o f  study form. That is, for each picture/word 
presented at test, subjects indicated what they recollected (picture or word study form), 
and how they recollected it (“remember,” “know,” “not at all”). Responses on the 
remember/know test were used to create four dependent variables (recognition.
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remember, know, and correct source identification responses), so that we could assess the 
effect o f our manipulations on various indices o f memory.
It was expected that there would be an overall picture superiority effect in the 
present study that would interact with test form. That is, picture superiority was expected 
to be larger when pictures, rather than words, were presented at test. In terms o f  the 
effect o f the manipulation of meaning, two hypotheses were presented. First, it was 
hypothesized that increased elaboration of meaning at study would facilitate memory for 
words more than for pictures; that is, the picture superiority effect would be reduced in 
the questions group only with congruent questions. Second, it was hypothesized that 
incongruent meaning questions would disrupt meaning encoding more for pictures than 
for words; that is, memory performance with pictures was predicted to be lower with 
incongruent questions in the questions condition than in the no questions condition; it 
was expected that memory performance with words would be similar in the incongruent 
question and no questions conditions.
In terms o f the differences between the dependent variables (i.e., remember, 
know, source identification), certain patterns are expected. First, because source memory 
is, by definition, “the ability to remember the context in which a particular piece o f 
information has been learned”, (Rybash et al., 1995, p. 112), it has been argued that the 
processes underlying source and remember judgments are neurally and functionally 
equivalent (e.g., Conway & Dewhurst, 1994; Dewhurst & Conway, 1994; Dewhurst & 
Hitch, 1999; Rugg, Schloerscheidt, & Mark, 1998; Wilding & Rugg, 1996). This notion 
has been supported by neuroimaging studies showing that the electrophysiology o f 
remember and source responses are similar (Rugg et al., 1998). Thus, in the present
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experiment, it was expected that source identification and remember responses would 
show a similar pattern o f results. Second, as mentioned above, remember and know 
judgements are thought to represent recollection (based on the conscious retrieval o f a 
specific study episode) and familiarity (based on information devoid o f  contextual 
context), respectively (Gardiner & Java, 1991; 1993; Rajaram, 1993; 1996; Tulving,
1983; 1985a; 1985b). In support of this view, several variables have been shown to 
affect remember and know responses in different ways, including Rajaram’s (1993) 
finding o f opposite picture/word memory performance in remember and observed know 
responses (i.e., she found picture superiority in remember responses and word superiority 
in observed know responses). Therefore, it is expected than remember and know results 
will be differentially affected the by manipulations in the present experiment, providing 
further evidence for a dissociation between remember and know phenomena. In 
particular, based on Rajaram’s (1993) result, we expected picture superiority effects to be 
observed in remember, but not know, results.
A subsidiary purpose o f the present design was to investigate the interdependent 
nature o f episodic memory between incidentally and intentionally encoded events. For 
this purpose, the experiment included a manipulation of sensory features (colour) at study 
and test Recall that the notion of interactive encoding suggests that when memory for 
any part o f the episode is improved (e.g., memory for meaning), there should be positive 
benefits in memory for other parts of the episode, even otherwise unrelated information 
(e.g., memory for sensory information) (Hayman & Rickards, 1995). Hayman and 
Cribbie (1998) found that memory for task relevant sensory features (i.e., picture colour) 
was higher following congruent meaning and incongruent colour processing than
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incongruent meaning/congruent colour, congruent meaning/incongruent colour, and 
incongruent meaning/incongruent colour processing. Our interpretation of interactive 
encoding suggests that memory for irrelevant information (i.e., study colour when no 
orienting questions about sensory information is presented at study) should be similarly 
affected by manipulations o f meaning, to the extent that some degree o f incidental colour 
encoding occurs. Therefore, while the present study manipulated explicit attention only 
to meaning, it was predicted that, in a 4AFC (four-alternative forced choice) test o f  
memory for the colour of the study stimulus, memory for sensory features (colour) would 
be better for pictures, and perhaps words, studied following congruent rather than 
incongruent questions. Previously, Kolers, Duchnicky, and Sundstroem (1985) found that 
memory for pictures was more sensitive to variation in sensory features between study 
and test than was memory for the names (words) o f these pictures. Similarly, we 
expected incidental memory o f colour to be better for pictures than for words. Finally, 
because interactive encoding applies to episodic and not semantic memory (Hayman et 
al., 1993; Metcalfe et al., 1992; Tulving, 1993), this facilitation in sensory memory from 
meaning elaboration is expected to depend on remember/know recognition. That is, 
better memory for sensory features was expected following congruent than incongruent 
questions only for items which are represented in and retrieved from episodic memory 
(i.e., those rated “remember” rather than “know”).
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Method
Subjects
Seventy-two introductory psychology students (30 males and 42 females) at 
Lakehead University participated in the experiment for course credit. They were pseudo- 
randomly assigned to one o f four groups.
Materials
One hundred and eighty four pictures (black on white line drawings) and their 
verbal labels were selected from those used by Snodgrass and Vanderwart (1980). One 
hundred and twenty were used as targets, 24 as study buffers, and 40 as recognition test 
lures. These stimuli are standardized according to four variables related to processing: 1) 
name agreement, 2) image agreement, 3) familiarity, and 4) visual complexity (Snodgrass 
& Vanderwart, 1980).
O f the 16 categories in Snodgrass and Vanderwart’s original set, ten (animals, 
birds, clothing, fish, furniture, grooming, insects, kitchen supplies, miscellaneous, and 
musical instruments) were used to construct lists o f target pictures/words. Six sub lists o f 
20 target pictures/words each were constructed, using items fiom each of the 10 
categories in each sublist. For each subject, four o f the six sublists were presented during 
study and two were presented during the test phase (as nonstudied test lures). To 
counterbalance the presentation o f target pictures/words at study and test, the sublists 
were rotated among the subjects, such that each o f the six sublists ZQ)peared in each study 
and test condition an equal number o f times.
The 24 study buffers and 40 recognition lures were selected from the remaining six 
categories (tools, toys, vehicles, body parts, fiiiits, and vegetables) o f Snodgrass and
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Vanderwart’s (1980) se t The study buffers were used to control for primacy and recency 
effects. Eight primacy items and 16 recency items were presented at the beginning and 
end o f the study list Thus, a total number o f 104 items (80 target items and 24 study 
buffers) were presented during the study phase.
To equate the proportion o f “old” and “new” items presented during the 
remember/know test phase (and therefore reduce the likelihood o f a response bias), 40 
recognition lures were included. These items were never present at study (i.e., they were 
nonstudied items for all subjects). Because these items were different material from the 
targets, responses were recorded but not analyzed. Thus, combined with the 40 items 
from the two nonstudied target sublists (20 from each o f 2 sublists), the remember/know 
test consisted of 80 nonstudied items (40 items from two target sublists and 40 
recognition lures) and 80 studied items (all from the four target sublists).
To test memory for sensory features (i.e., colour), the black and white pictures from 
Snodgrass and Vanderwart’s (1980) original set were transformed into coloured line 
drawings on a black background. Each picture was assigned 4 different colours from a 
pool o f 8 colours (red, blue, green, yellow, orange, brown, pink and purple). Colours 
were assigned with the constraint that: 1) no picture was assigned a colour in which a 
prior association existed (e.g., a picture o f  a frog would not be assigned the colour green), 
and 2) each of the eight colours occurred with roughly equal frequency. Therefore, 
chance performance in a 4AFC test for nonstudied pictures should be at or close to 25% 
if  the target colour and the test lure colours had no prior association with the pictures.
This assumption was tested using the nonstudied targets or lures.
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To manipulate meaning, each picture was assigned a congruent or incongruent 
description (in question form) o f  it’s meaning (only one o f which was presented at study). 
The congruent questions made reference to a defining characteristic o f  the object depicted 
in each picture. For example, included were statements regarding the function or typical 
uses of the object (e.g., “used to kiss?” for lips), popular beliefs about the object (e.g., 
“keeps the doctor away?” for apple), object animacy (e.g., “back and forth?” for a swing), 
and physical descriptions (“a spotted cat?” for a leopard). Alternatively, incongruent 
questions assigned to each picture were not related to the meaning o f  the object depicted 
(e.g., “a sticky condiment?” for a truck). Care was taken to ensure that the respective 
congruent/incongruent descriptions for each picture were unrelated. For example, the 
congment question about the picture of a horse was “a cowboy’s transportation?” 
whereas the incongruent meaning statement was a “dangerous substance?” (rather than a 
reference to a similarly phrased, but opposite, concept). A Macintosh Power 6400 
computer was used to present the stimuli, and to collect and tabulate responses.
Design
The design of the experiment was a mixed factorial (between/within). The 
between-subj ects factors were: 1) instructions (questions or no questions) and 2) test 
form (pictures or words at test). The within-subjects factors were: 1) study form (pictures 
or words at study) and 2) question context (congruent or incongruent). There were two 
measures: 1) responses on the remember/know test (remember, know, or nonstudied), and 
2) responses on the 4AFC test o f  colour recognition.
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Procedure
Subjects were tested individually. To ensure that the colours could accurately be 
distinguished, the eight possible colours were first presented on the computer screen 
along with their respective labels (i.e., red, blue, green, yellow, orange, brown, pink and 
purple), and subjects were asked to distinguish between them. In the questions group, a 
congruent/incongruent question was presented on the computer screen for four seconds; 
in the noquestions group a series of"*" symbols were presented. Following a one 
second blank screen, a coloured picture or word was presented for three seconds, 
accompanied by a “query box” (that remained until the subjects responded) containing 
the options, “1) Yes” and “2) No.” The subjects were required to respond (by pressing 
“1” for “yes” and “2” for “no”) as to whether the preceding phrase accurately described 
the picture or word (i.e., whether it’s meaning was “congruent” or “incongruent”). In the 
no questions group, the query box contained the words, “ 1) To Continue” (since a 
congruent/incongruent decision was not required). Subjects in the no questions group 
responded by pressing “ 1.” Subjects were given as much time as necessary to respond.
The next trial began two seconds after subjects responded.
Immediately following the Study Phase, each subject was asked to complete a 
paper and pencil “famous names” quiz for 10 minutes. This was done in order to reduce 
the likelihood of ceiling effects on the following tests (Cribbie, 1995; Rajaram, 1993). In 
the quiz, subjects were required to answer a series o f multiple-choice questions pertaining 
to celebrities from a variety o f domains (e.g., well-known authors, actors/actresses, 
musicians, etc.).
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Following the “famous names” quiz, each subject was first asked to read 
descriptions o f  “remember” versus “know” recognition (see Appendix A). Once subjects 
had finished reading and indicated that they understood the difference between 
“remember” and “know” judgments, the experimenter verbally repeated the distinction 
and answered any questions. Subjects were then presented with a remember/know 
recognition test containing a total of 160 pictures or 160 words (80 study targets, 40 
nonstudied targets and 40 test lures). The subjects responded by selecting one of five 
options: 1) Remember Picture fiom study session, 2) Remember Word from study 
session, 3) Know Picture (or similar one) was studied, 4) Know Word (or similar one) 
was studied, or 5) Not studied as picture or word. There was no time limit to respond. 
Subjects responded by using the keyboard, after which the next trial was presented 
(following a one second blank screen).
Following the remember/know recognition test, the 4AFC test was presented: 
subjects were given a 4AFC test o f 120 pictures or 120 words (80 previously-studied 
target items and 40 nonstudied target items, presented individually). Each picture and 
word was presented simultaneously in four different coloured versions, one in each o f the 
four comers o f the computer screen. For studied targets, one colour matched the study 
colour; for lures, subjects had to guess. When one of fom designated responses (the keys 
“1”, “2”, “4” or “5”) were pressed on the keypad, an arrow would appear in the centre of 
the screen, pointing in the direction of one of the 4 coloured-versions o f the picture or 
word (i.e., the numbers “ I”, “2”, “4”, and “5” pointed the arrow at corresponding 
quadrants o f the screen). Subjects were required to choose the colour in which they
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believed the study items were presented in Study Phase. They were instructed to guess if  
they were not sure o f the answer.
Following the experiment, subjects were debriefed as to the nature and purpose o f  
the study. They were also instructed on whom to contact regarding any concerns about 
the experiment
Results
Remember/Know Recognition Test 
Subjects’ responses from categories one to five (i.e., remember picture, remember 
word, know picture, know word and not studied) were used to create four dependent 
variables; recognition, remember, know, and correct source responses for studied and 
nonstudied pictures and words. Recognition responses were computed by summing 
across categories one to four, inclusive. Remember responses were computed by 
summing across response categories one and two. Know responses were computed by 
summing across response categories three and four. Correct source responses were 
computed by summing across response categories one and three for pictures, and two and 
four for words. The effect o f the experimental manipulations on these four dependent 
variables will be considered in turn.
Recognition Responses
Table 1 displays the mean proportion of items correctly recognized in all 40 test 
conditions—four between-subj ect (two instructions X two test form) by ten within-subject 
(two study form X two question context X two colour, plus nonstudied items) conditions. 
By visual inspection, there tq)peared to be no effect o f “same” (rows one to four) versus 
“different” (rows five to eight) study/test colour. A preliminary analysis (involving the
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32 conditions) looking at the benefit o f maintaining the study colour o f tested pictures 
and words confirmed this: the main effect (F  < I) and all interactions involving coloiu- 
were not significant The main effect o f colour was [F(l, 68) = .836, MS^ = .013] and the 
two-way interactions involving colour were [F(l, 68) = 2.25, MSc = .097; F (l, 68), =
.066, = .097; F ( l, 68), = .096, MS^ = .015; and F (l, 68), = 1.88, MS^ = .014 for
instructions, test form, study form, and question context, respectively (all p s  > .050)] for 
recognition responses. Interactions involving test colour which failed to achieve 
significance were: a three-way interaction between test form and question context [F(l, 
68) = 1.52, MSc = .019], a three-way interaction between study form and question context 
[F(l, 68) =  2.18, MSc =  .013], a four-way interaction between instructions, study form, 
and question context [F (l, 68) = 2.62, MSc =  .013], and a five-way interaction between 
instructions, test form, study form, and question context [F(l, 68) = 3.11, MSc = 013] (all 
p s  > .100). All other (three-, four-, and five-way) interactions involving colour were not 
significant (all F s  < 1). Thus, the data for responses in “same” and “different” colour 
conditions were collapsed in the remaining recognition analyses to simplify 
interpretation.
Recognition hits — collapsed over colour.
Table 2 displays the mean proportion recognition, collapsed over colour, for the 
four between- (two instructions X two test form) and fi)ur within-subject (two study form 
X two question context) conditions. Inspection o f the means revealed an overall 
advantage o f study form, pictures greater than words, although the magnitude o f  the 
study form advantage appeared to interact with the instructions group manipulation (see 
rows five and six). This impression was confirmed i n a 2 X 2 X 2 X 2  mixed-factors
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MANOVA, with instructions (questions group versus no_questions group) and test form 
(picture versus word) as between-subj ect factors, and question context (congruent versus 
incongruent) and study form (picture versus word) as within-subject factors. There were 
significant main effects o f instructions [F(l, 68) =  18.46, MSc = .048,/? < .001] and study 
form [F(l, 68) =  138.68, MSc — .017,/? < .001], and a significant interaction between 
these variables [F(l, 68) = 12.18, M S c  = 017, p  < .001]. Differences between means 
leading to these main effects and interactions were evaluated in plaimed comparisons 
within groups using Fisher’s LSD o f .061 derived firom the MSc term o f the within- 
subject factor interaction. The advantage o f study picture over study word was larger in 
the no questions (means o f .83 and .60 for pictures and words, respectively, for a 
difference o f .23) than in the questions group (means of .89 and .76, for a difference of 
.13). An alternative interpretation o f the previous interaction is to consider how study 
form affected the between-group effects of instructions. A between-group comparison 
using Fisher’s LSD o f .103 (derived firom the MSc term of the between-subject factor of 
instructions) fotmd that the addition o f  orienting questions significantly increased 
recognition o f words (questions and no questions group means of .76 and .60, 
respectively, for a difference of .16), but not o f pictures (means o f .89 and .83, for a 
difference of .06).
Although the three-way interaction between instructions, study form and question 
context was not significant [F(l, 68) =  11.02, M S c  ~  .007,/? = .067], plaimed comparisons 
within groups (Fisher’s LSD of .039) were nonetheless conducted because it had been 
hypothesized that picture superiority would be reduced in the questions group only with 
congruent orienting questions. While the advantage of study picture over word was
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smaller in the congruent questions condition (difference o f .08) than in the incongruent 
questions condition—which was the same as in the congruent/no_questions and 
incongruent/no_questions conditions (differences o f .23, .25, and .17, respectively)— 
responses to pictures were significantly greater than to words in all conditions. However, 
this tqiparent reduction o f the picture/word advantage in the congruent questions 
condition may be due to ceiling effects, as will be addressed in the discussion.
Inspection o f the means in Table 2 also revealed that, as predicted, the benefit o f 
question context occurred in the questions group (row six), rather than in the 
no questions group (row five) because subjects in the no_questions group were presented 
with “♦♦♦*♦*” rather than congruent or incongruent orienting questions. This was 
confirmed by both a significant main effect o f question context [F(l, 68) = 55.58, MSc -  
.013,p  < .001], and a significant question context X instruction group interaction [F(l,
68) = 40.31, MSc = 5.00, p < .001]. Plaimed comparisons within groups (Fisher’s LSD = 
.053) found that the benefit of congruent over incongruent context was significant in the 
questions group (difference = .180) but not the no questions condition (difference =
.015).
In addition to instructions, study form also interacted with test form [F(l, 68) = 
26.59, MSc = .017,/? < .001] and question context [F(l, 68) = 8.73, MSc = .007, /? < .001]. 
There was also a significant three-way interaction between study form, test form, and 
question context [F(l, 68) = 11.02, MSc = 007,/? < .001]. Post hoc comparisons 
(Fisher’s LSD =  .039) suggest that the study picture over study word advantage was 
significant in each comparison, but was largest for test pictures, especially in the 
incongment condition (difference o f .32, as compared to .20, .11 and .10 in the
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congruent/test picture, congruent/test word and congruent/test picture conditions, 
respectively).
The main effect of test form failed to achieve significance [F(l, 68) =  1.01, MSc ~ 
.048, /7 > 1], as did its interactions with instructions and question context (both F s < 1). 
All other (two-, three-, and four-way) interactions were not significant (all F s  <  1).
In summary, as predicted, recognition responses showed an overall advantage of 
study pictures over study words that interacted with instructions and question context. 
There was support for the hypothesis that picture superiority would be reduced by 
congruent orienting questions, in that the advantage of study pictures over study words 
was smallest in the congruent questions condition.
Recognition false alarms — collapsed over colour.
Recognition false alarms are presented in column five of Table 2. As can be seen, 
responses to noiKtudied items were noticeably lower than responses to studied items.
False recognition was the same for the two instruction groups [F(l, 68) = 2.71, M S c  =  
.021,/? > .100] and the two test form groups [F(l, 68) = 1.33, MSc = .021,/? >  .100]. 
Remember Responses
A preliminary analysis involving the 32 conditions looked at the benefit o f 
m aintaining  the Study colour o f tested pictures and words. This revealed one significant 
effect involving study/test colour: a marginally significant main effect [F (l, 68) = 6.18, 
MSc — 022, p  <  .050], where items presented in the same colour at study and test (mean = 
.49) were remembered better than items presented in a different colour at study and test 
(mean =  .45). All interactions involving colour failed to achieve significance, including 
the two-way interactions between colour and instructions [F(l, 68) = 2.66, MSc ~  -022],
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test forai [F (l, 68) =  .203, M S c  =  -022], study form [F(l, 68) =  2.32, M S c  = .023], or 
question context [F(l, 68) =  .853, MSc = -019] (allp s  > .1). Other interactions involving 
colour that failed to achieve significance included; a three-way interaction between 
instructions and study form [F(l, 68) = 1.56, MSc = -015], a three-way interaction 
between instructions and question context [F(l, 68) = 1.80, MSc = -019], and a four-way 
interaction involving instructions, test form, and question context [F(l, 68) = 2.14, M S c  = 
.019] (all p s  > .100). All other (three-, four-, and five-way) interactions involving colour 
were not significant (all Fs < 1). Thus, as with recognition, responses in “same” and 
“different” colour conditions were collapsed to simplify interpretation.
Remember hits — collapsed over colour.
Table 3 displays the mean proportion o f correct remember responses, collapsed 
over colour, for the 16 conditions (four between- X four within-subject conditions). 
Inspection of the means in Table 3 revealed an overall picture over word advantage that, 
unlike with recognition responses, did not interact with the instruction groups (see rows 
five and six). Analysis confirmed this impression. There were significant main effects o f  
instructions [F(l, 68) = 4.63, MSc — -162,/? < .050] and study form [F(l, 68) = 79.23,
MSc = -037, p  < .001], but no significant interaction between them (F  < 1). Thus, the 
picture over word advantage was the same for the no questions group (difference = .22) 
and the questions group (difference = .20).
The three-way interaction between instructions, study form and question context 
was not significant, F (l, 68) = .745, MSc = -009,/? > .1. Plaimed comparisons (Fisher’s 
LSD o f .044) were nonetheless conducted as it was hypothesized that picture superiority 
would be reduced in the questions group only with congruent questions. However,
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contrary to the hypothesis, it was found that the advantage o f study pictures over study 
words was significant in all conditions (differences o f .20, .22, .20, and .19 for the 
congruent/no_questions, incongruenl/no_questions, congruent/questions, and 
incongruent/questions conditions, respectively).
As observed with recognition responses, inspection o f the means in Table 3 
suggested that the advantage o f congruent over incongruent context occurred only in the 
questions (row six), and not the no questions (row five), group. Analyses confirmed that 
there was a significant main effect o f question context [F(l, 68) = 55.83, MSc =  .017,/? < 
.001], as well as an instruction X question context interaction [F(l, 68) = 57.91, M S c  =  
.017,/? < .001]. Planned comparisons within groups (Fisher’s LSD = .053) revealed that 
the benefit o f congruent over incongruent context was significant in the questions group 
(difference = .228) but not the no_questions group (difference = .002).
There was a significant interaction between study form and test form [F(l, 68) = 
6.87, MSc = .037, /? < .050], but, unlike for recognition responses, the two-way interaction 
between study form and question context was not significant (F  < 1), as was the three- 
way interaction between study form, test form, and question context [F(l, 68) =  1.70,
MSc = .009,/? > .100]. Post hoc comparisons (Fisher’s LSD = .044) of the study form X 
test form interaction showed that the advantage of study pictures over study words was 
larger for items tested as pictures (difference = .26) than words (difference = .14).
As in recognition, the main effect o f test form [F(l, 68) = 1.01, MSc =  .048] was 
not significant (F  < 1), nor were its interactions with instructions (F < 1) and question 
context [F(l, 68) = 1.53, MSc — .017,/? > .100]. All other (two-, three-, and four-way) 
interactions were not significant (all Fs < 1).
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In summary, remember responses showed an overall picture over word advantage 
that, unlike for recognition and contrary to our hypothesis, did not interact with 
instructions and/or question context.
Remember false alarms — collapsed over colour.
False alarms for remember responses are presented in column five o f Table 3. As 
can be seen, remember responses to nonstudied items were noticeably lower than 
responses to studied items. False remember responses were the same for the two 
instruction groups [F(l, 68) = 2.79, MSc — .006,/? > .050] and the two test form groups 
[F(l, 68) =  1.48, M S c  = .006,/? > .100].
Know Responses
Observed Frequencies o f Know
A preliminary analysis (of the 32 study conditions) looking at the benefit of 
maintaining the study colour of tested pictures and words revealed no significant main 
effects or interactions involving colour. The main effect o f colour was [F(l, 68) = 3.10, 
M S c  =  .022] and the two-way interactions involving colour were [F(l, 68) = .225, M S c  =  
.022; F (l, 68) = .063, M S c  = .022; F (l, 68) =  1.78, M S c  = .022; and F (l, 68) =  3.19, M S c  
= .013, for instructions, test form, study form, and question context, respectively (all p s  > 
.050)] for observed know responses. Other interactions involving colour that failed to 
achieve significance were: a three-way interaction between instructions and study form 
[F(l, 68) =  3.84, M S c  = 022], a three-way interaction between test form and question 
context [F(l, 68) = 1.45, MSc — .013], and a four-way interaction between instructions, 
study form and question context [F(l, 68) = 3.39, MSc = .014] (allps > .100). All other
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(three-, four-, and five-way) interactions involving colour were not significant (all Fs <
1). The data for responses in “same” and “different” colour conditions were collapsed in 
the remaining observed know analyses.
Observed know hits — collapsed over colour.
Table 4 displays the mean proportion o f correct observed know responses, 
collapsed over colour, for the 16 studied conditions (four between- X four within-subject 
conditions). Inspection of the means revealed a different pattern than that for recognition 
and remember responses; there appeared to be no differences due to study form in either 
instruction group (see rows five and six). Analysis confirmed this impression, with no 
significant main effects o f instructions or study form (both Fs < 1). However, there was a 
significant three-way interaction between instructions, study form and question context 
[F(l, 68) = 7.54, MSe = .007, p  < .100], as well as significant two-way interactions 
between instructions and study form [F(l, 68) = 4.12, MSe = .035,p  < .050], study form 
and question context [F(l, 68) = 6.79, MSe = .007, p  < .050], and instructions and 
question context [F(l, 68) = 5.36, MSe = .013,/? < .050]. Plarmed comparisons o f the 
three-way interaction (Fisher’s LSD = .039) conducted to test the hypothesis that picture 
superiority would be reduced in the questions group only with congruent questions found 
the reverse pattern. There was a significant negative advantage of study picture over 
study word in the congruent questions condition (difference = -.120), while positive but 
not significant differences o f study picture/word in the incongruent questions, 
congment/no_questions, and incongment/no questions conditions (differences o f .013, 
.025 and .022, respectively).
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Unlike recognition and remember results, the main effect o f question context 
[F(l, 68) = 1.20, MSc =  .013,/? > .050] was not significant, nor was the main effect o f test 
form (F <  1) and its interactions with instructions [F(l, 68) = 3.05, MSc = .132,/? >  .050], 
study fonn (F < 1), and question context (F  <  1). Other interactions that failed to achieve 
significance were: a three-way interaction between test form, instructions and study form 
[F(l, 68) = 2.23, MSc =  035,/? > .050] and a three-way interaction between test form, 
study form, and question context [F(l, 68) =  2.90, MSc = .007,/? > .050]. All other (two-, 
three-, and four-way) interactions were not significant (all Fs < 1).
In summary, a reversal of the picture superiority effect was observed in the 
congruent questions condition, while observed know responses for pictures and words 
were observed to be similar in all other comparisons.
Observed know false alarms — collapsed over colour.
Observed know false alarms are presented in column five o f Table 4. As can be 
seen, know responses to nonstudied items were lower than responses to studied items. 
False observed know responses were the same for the two instruction groups and the two 
test form groups (both Fs < 1).
Estimated Probabilitv o f Know
The anomalies in the observed know findings (e.g., an absence o f an effect o f 
instructions and question context, with no interaction between test form and study form), 
raise questions about how to interpret the results. I f  we equate observed know responses 
as a direct measure o f a specific process o f memory, then we are implicitly assuming that 
the relationship between remember and this know memory process is one of perfect 
negative (r = -1.00) dependence (i.e., it assumes that one could not remember and know
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at the same time). O f course, the relationship between the two may not be one o f 
negative dependence. It may be positive or neutral or somewhere in between the 
extremes. It would be useful to examine the interpretation o f the observed know 
responses in models other than negative dependence. If  one were to assume 
independence (r =  0.00) between remember and know, it would be necessary to estimate 
the probability o f know using the following formula:
est. /j(know) = observed know/[ 1 — /^(remember)]. ( 1 )
That is, the “estimated probability o f know” would be calculated by dividing the 
proportion o f know responses by the proportion not remembered, for each subject and 
each condition.
In a preliminary analysis of the estimated know responses looking at the benefit 
o f maintaining the study colour of tested pictures and words, the main effect (F  < 1) and 
all interactions involving colour were not significant. All two-way interactions involving 
colour were not significant, F  < 1, as were the three-way interactions involving colour 
and test form and question context [F(l, 52) = 3.48, MSc = .044] and instructions and 
question context [F(l, 52) = 1.12, MSc = .044]. Other interactions that failed to achieve 
significance were: a four-way interaction between instructions, test form and question 
context [F(l, 52) = 1.36, MSc = .044], a four-way interaction between instructions, study 
form and question context [F(l, 52) = 1.13, MSc = .041], a four-way interaction between 
test form, study form, and question context [F(l, 52) = 1.60, M S c  = 044], and the five­
way interaction between instructions, test form, study form, and question context [F(l,
52) = 1.22, MSc =  .041] (all p s > .100). All other (three-, four-, and five-way) 
interactions involving colour were not significant (all Fs < 1). Thus, the data for
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responses in “same” and “different” colour conditions were collapsed in the remaining 
estimated probability o f  know analyses.
Estimated probability o f know hits -  collapsed over colour.
Table 5 displays the mean estimated probability o f  know responses, collapsed 
over colour, for the 16 conditions (four between- X four within-subject conditions). 
Inspection o f the means in Table 5 revealed an overall advantage of pictures over words 
that, like recognition and unlike remember responses, appeared to interact with the 
instructions group (see rows five and six). Analysis confirmed this impression. There 
were significant main effects of study form [F(l, 63) = 23.59, MSc = -040,/? < .001] and 
instructions [F(l, 63) = 4.001, MSc = .169,p  = .050], as well as a significant interaction 
between these variables [F(l, 63) = 11.59, MSc = 040, p  < .010]. Planned comparisons 
within groups (Fisher’s LSD = .101) found that the advantage of study pictures over 
study words was not significant in the questions (difference =  .202), but was in the 
no_questions (difference = .047) group.
As with recognition and remember responses, the three-way interaction between 
instructions, study form and question context was not significant (F < 1). Again, planned 
comparisons (Fisher’s LSD = .091) were conducted to test the hypothesis that picture 
superiority would be reduced in the questions group only with congruent questions. 
Supporting the hypothesis, the advantage o f study pictures over study words was smallest 
and not significant in the congruent question condition (indeed, a slight word advantage 
was found—difference =  -.007), and significant and larger in the incongruent question, 
congruent/no_questions, and incongruent/no questions groups (differences o f .158, ,246 
and .103 respectively).
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The effect o f question context was significant [F(l, 63) =  9.43, MSc = 035, p  < 
.010], as was its interaction with instructions [F(l, 63) = 9.95, MSc — 035, p  < .050]. 
Planned comparisons within groups (Fisher’s LSD = .094) revealed that the benefit o f 
congruent over incongruent context was significant in the questions group (difference = 
.151), but not the no questions group (difference =  .002) (since subjects in the 
no_questions group were presented with rather than congruent or incongruent
questions).
The interaction between study form and question context was also significant 
[F(l, 63) = 4.22, M S c  =  .033,p  < .050]. Post hoc comparisons within groups (Fisher’s 
LSD = .091) suggest that there was a benefit o f congruent over incongruent context for 
study words (difference = .124), but not study pictures (difference =  .024).
Like remember and unlike recognition responses, there was a significant 
interaction between test and study form [F(l, 63) = 13.49, MSc — .040,p  < .001], but the 
three-way interaction between test form, study form, and question context was not 
significant [F(l, 63) = 2.54, MSc ~  033, p  > .100]. Post hoc comparisons within groups 
(Fisher’s LSD = .101) o f the test form X study form interaction found that the advantage 
o f study pictures over study words was significant when tested as pictures (difference = 
.215) but not when tested as words (difference =  .032).
As with recognition and remember responses, the main effect o f test form was not 
significant (F < 1), nor were its interactions with instructions [F(l, 63) — 4.00, MSc —
.169, p  >  . 1] and question context (F  < 1). Other interactions that failed to achieve 
significance were: three-way interactions between instructions, test form, and study form 
[F(l, 63) = 2.54, MSc ~  .040], instructions, test form, and question context [F(l, 63) =
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2.24, MSc =  035], and test form, study form, and question context [F(l, 63) = 2.54, MSc ~  
.033] (allp s  > .1). All other (two-, three-, and four-way) interactions were not significant 
(aU Fs< I).
In summary, when independence was assumed to be the relationship between 
remember and estimated know responses, the estimated probability o f  know responses 
were similar to those o f recognition responses in that the advantage o f  study pictures over 
words was significant in all conditions except for the congruent question condition, 
supporting the hypothesis that picture superiority would be reduced under congruent 
meaning conditions.
Estimated probability o f know false alarms — collapsed over colour.
Estimated probability of know false alarms responses to nonstudied items are 
presented in column five o f Table 5. The estimated probability o f a know response to 
nonstudied items were clearly lower than to studied items. The estimated responses did 
not differ as a function of instruction and test form (F < 1).
Source Identification Responses
A preliminary analysis o f the 32 study conditions looking at study/test colour 
found only one significant effect: a marginally significant colour X instructions 
interaction [F(l, 68) = 2.25, MSc — .014, p  < .050]. Post hoc comparisons o f difference 
scores between “same” and “different” coloured items revealed that in the no questions 
group, performance was significantly better for same items (mean = .037), while there 
were no differences in the questions group (mean = -.008), t(70) = 2.29, p  < .05. The 
main effect o f colour was not significant [F(l, 68) =  2.20, M S c  = .014/? > .100], nor were 
the two-way interactions involving colour [F(1,68), = .499, M S c  = .014; F (l, 68), = .386,
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MSc =  .012; and F ( l , 68), = 1.16, MSc ~  .020 with test form, study form, and question 
context, respectively (all p s > .05)]. Other interactions involving test colour that failed to 
achieve significance were: a three-way interaction between instructions and question 
context [F(1,68) = 1.30, M S c  = 017], a three-way interaction between study form and 
question context [F(l, 68) = 3.57, M S c  = .012], a four-way interaction involving 
instructions, study form, and question context [F(l, 68) = 1.85, M S c  ~  .012], and a four­
way interaction between test form, study form, and question context [F(l, 68) =  3.29,
M S c  = .012] (all p s  > .100). All other three-, fi)ur-, and five-way interactions involving 
colour were not significant (all P 's < 1). Thus, as before, the responses in “same” and 
“different” colour conditions were collapsed for the remaining source identification 
analyses.
Source memory hits — collapsed over colour.
Table 6 displays the mean proportion o f correct source identification responses, 
collapsed over colour, for the 16 study conditions (four between- X four within-subject 
conditions). Inspection o f the means in Table 6 revealed a pattern similar to that o f 
remember responses—an overall picture over word advantage that did not interact with 
instruction groups (see rows five and six). Analyses confirmed that there were significant 
main effects o f instructions [F(l, 68) = 16.07, MSc — -06 \,p  < .001] and study form [F(l, 
68) = 86.61, MSc =  .037, p  < .001], but no significant interaction between them (F  < 1). 
Thus, a similar significant advantage of study pictures over study words was seen for 
both the no_questions (difference =  .23) and questions (difference = .18) groups.
The three-way interaction between instructions, study form and question context 
was not significant (F  < 1). As before, plarmed comparisons (Fisher’s LSD o f .042) were
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nonetheless conducted because it had been hypothesized that picture superiority would be 
reduced in the questions group only with congruent questions. Contrary to the 
hypothesis, it was found that the advantage o f  study pictures over study words was 
significant in all conditions (differences o f .17, .21, .22, and .24 in the congruent 
questions, incongruent questions, congruent/nojquestions, and incongruent/no questions 
groups, respectively).
As found in all previous results, the advantage of congruent over incongruent 
context in source identification responses occurred only in the questions, and not in the 
no_questions, group. This was confirmed by a significant main effect o f question context 
[F (l, 68) = 41.49, MSc = .012,p  < .001] and an instruction X question context interaction 
[F (l, 68) = 29.30, M S c  = 012,p  < .001], where the difference between congruent over 
incongruent context was significant (Fisher’s LSD = .051) in the questions (difference = 
.153) but not in the no questions group (difference = .013).
There was a significant interaction between study form and test form [F(l, 68) = 
37.74, MSc = 037, p  < .001] and a significant three-way interaction between study form, 
test form and question context [F(l, 68) =  14.58, MSc = 008,p  > .1], but the interaction 
between study form and question context was not significant [F(l, 68) = 1.57, M S c  =
.008, p  > .100]. Post hoc analyses o f the three-way interaction (Fisher’s LSD = .042) 
revealed that the advantage of study pictures over study words was larger for items tested 
as pictures—especially in the incongruent, rather than congruent, context condition 
(difference o f .40, as compared to .30)—than for items tested as words, which showed no 
study picture/word differences (difference o f .01, and .04 in the congruent and 
incongruent conditions, respectively).
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The main effect o f test form was not significant (F  < 1), nor were its interactions 
with instructions [F(l, 68) = 1.53, MSc =  .061, p  >  .100] and question context (F  <  1).
All other (two-, three, and four-way) interactions were not significant (all Fs < 1).
In summary, the pattern of source identification responses was similar to 
remember responses. That is, there was an overall picture over word advantage that did 
not interact with instructions.
Source memorv false alarms — collapsed over colour.
False alarms for picture and word source responses are presented in columns five 
and six o f Table 6. As can be seen, responses to nonstudied items were noticeably lower 
than responses to studied items. However, while there was no significant effect o f  
instructions [F (l, 68) = 2.71, MSc = .041,p  > .100] or test form [F(l, 68) = 1.33, MSc = 
.041, p  > .100], there was a significant main effect o f study form [F(l, 68) = 24.98, MSc -  
.026, p  < .001], where subjects were more likely to falsely respond word (mean = .027) 
than picture (mean = .014). Because o f  this guessing bias, false responses to the studied 
items were corrected by subtracting nonstudied responses firom study responses 
categories one and three for pictures and categories two and four for words. These 
old/new difference scores were then reanalyzed i n a 2 X 2 X 2 X 2  mixed-factors 
MANOVA. However, because the pattern o f significant and nonsignificant effects was 
identical to the analysis of uncorrected source identification for studied items, the 
analysis is not reported here.
Four-Alternative Forced Choice Test
A subsidiary purpose o f the experiment was to evaluate if  there was incidental 
memory o f  study colour for pictures and words using a four-alternative forced choice
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(4AFC) test of colour recognition. In the 4AFC test, subjects selected one o f four 
coloured line drawings. In half o f  the study and half o f the nonstudy test trials, one o f the 
4 AFC colours had been seen in the previous test o f recognition (test primed), while in the 
remaining study and nonstudy trials none o f the 4AFC choices had been seen in the 
previous test of recognition (nonprimed). Thus, studied and nonstudied pictures and 
words were analyzed in test primed and nonprimed 4AFC responses.
Table 7 displays the mean proportion of4AFC responses in all 40 test conditions- 
-four between-subject (two instructions X two test form) by ten within-subject (two study 
form X two question context X  two colour, plus nonstudied items) conditions. Visual 
inspection of the means in Table 7 revealed that responses to primed items (rows 1 to 4) 
were greater than those to nonprimed items (rows 5 to 8) for both studied (columns 1 to 
4) and nonstudied (column 5) items. This effect for nonstudied items was confirmed in a 
2 X 2 X 2  mixed-factors MANOVA, with test priming (primed versus nonprimed) as the 
within-subject factor, and instructions (questions versus no questions) and test form 
(pictures versus words) as between-subj ect factors. There was a significant main effect 
o f test priming [F(l, 68) = 8.91, MSc =  01 l ,p  < .010], where primed (mean = . 122) were 
greater than nonprimed (mean = .101). Because the effect of test priming should 
influence responses to studied as well as nonstudied items, the proportion for studied 
items was adjusted by subtracting responses to nonstudied items in an attempt to control 
for test priming.
Table 8 displays the mean proportion of corrected (studied items minus 
nonstudied items) 4AFC colour recognition for the four between- (two instructions X two 
test form) and four within-subject (two study form X two question context) conditions.
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Inspection o f these also suggested an advantage o f test priming, with primed (rows 1 to 4) 
greater than nonprimed responses (rows 5 to 8), which appeared to interact with test 
form. This impression was confirmed i n a 2 X 2 X 2 X 2 X 2  mixed-factors MANOVA 
o f studied items, with instructions (questions group versus no questions group) and test 
form (picture versus word) as between-subject factors, and test priming (primed versus 
nonprimed), question context (congruent versus incongruent), and study form (picture 
versus word) as within-subject factors. There was a significant three-way interaction 
between test form, test priming, and study form [F(l, 68) = 13.65, MSc = .013], as well as 
significant main effects o f test priming [F(l, 68) = 8.23, M S c  ~  058] and study form 
[F(l, 68) = 25.84, MSc — .026], and a significant two-way interaction between test and 
study form [F(l, 68) = 15.95, MSc ~  026, p  < .001] (allp s  < .001). Post hoc comparisons 
within groups for the three-way interaction (Fisher’s LSD = .053) revealed that the 
advantage o f primed over nonprimed responses was larger for items presented in the 
same form at study and test (differences o f .113 and .034 for study pictures and words 
tested a pictures and .010 and .072 for study pictures and words tested as words, where 
same study/test form are underlined).
There was a significant main effect o f instructions [F(l, 68) = 11.24, M S c  = .113, 
p  < .010], where 4AFC colour recognition was better when subjects received no question 
(mean = .164) than question (mean = .070) instructions at study. That is, attention to 
meaning appeared to decrease incidental memory o f  colour.
None o f the other effects were significant. The two-way interactions involving 
instructions with test form [F(l, 68) = 1.31, MSc = .113,/) > .100] and study form [F(l,
68) = 2.76, M S c  — .026,/) > .100] failed to achieve significance, as did three-way
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interactions between test form, test priming, question context [F(l, 68) = 1.63, MSc = 
.019], instructions, study form, and question context [F(l, 68) = 3.76, MSc = .024], test 
form, study form and question context [F(l, 68) =  2.12, MSc = .051], and a four-way 
interaction between test form, study form, encoding context, and test priming [F(l, 68) = 
1.02, MSc — -020] (all ps > .050). All other (two-, three, four-, and five-way) interactions 
were not significant (Fs < 1).
To provide fiuther support for the notion o f  interactive encoding in incidental 
episodic memory, we had intended to test the hypothesis that incidental memory for 
colour would be better for pictures and words studied under congruent (rather than 
incongruent) question context conditions for remember (rather than know) responses. 
However, because there were so few “know” responses in the remember/know 
recognition test, it was impossible to properly compare correct colour recognition for 
remember and know items. Thus, we were unable to test the hypothesis.
In summary, incidental colour recognition (as measured by the 4AFC test) was 
better for primed items, especially those presented in the same form at study and test. In 
addition, colour recognition was better in the no questions group than the questions 
group. This result is different fi-om Hayman and Cribbie’s (1998) finding that memory 
for task relevant sensory features (i.e., picture colour) was higher following congruent 
meaning and congment colour processing than incongruent meaning/congruent colour, 
congruent meaning/incongruent colour, or incongruent meaning/incongruent colour. 
Manipulating explicit attention only to meaning (but not colour) appears to reduce, rather 
than increase, memory for colour. These results suggest that the link between meaning 
elaboration and incidental colour requires explicit attention to bind them in episodic
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memory. Since these findings are secondary to the main purpose o f the present study (to 
examine the effect o f  meaning elaboration on picture/word memory), these findings will 
not be discussed further.
Discussion
There were five noteworthy results in the experiment: 1) a main effect o f study 
form (i.e., a picture superiority effect) in recognition, source identification, remember, 
and estimated know responses, but not in observed know responses; 2) an interaction 
between study and test form, which was similar in size for pictures and words, in 
recognition, source identification, remember, and estimated know responses, but not in 
observed know responses; 3) no main effect o f test form in recognition, source 
identification, remember, estimated know, and observed know responses; 4) an 
interaction between study instructions and question context, where congruent questions 
benefited memory for both pictures and words, while incongruent questions had no such 
effect, in recognition, source identification, remember, and estimated know responses, 
but not in observed know responses; and 5) a reduction o f the picture superiority effect in 
the congruent question condition in recognition and estimated know responses, but not in 
source identification, remember, and observed know responses. These findings will be 
discussed in turn for each dependent variable: recognition, source identification, 
remember, observed know, and estimated know responses.
Recognition
First, a main effect of study form was found, where an advantage of study picture 
over study word was observed in both instruction groups, and in both test form groups. 
This is consistent with the picture superiority effect (Paivio, 1971), including findings o f
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an advantage o f  study pictures over study words on tests o f recognition (e.g., Madigan, 
1983; Mintzer & Snodgrass, 1999; Weldon & Coyote, 1998, etc., but see Durso & 
Johnson, 1980, and Emmerich & Ackerman, 1980).
Second, an interaction between study and test form was found in recognition 
responses. That is, recognition was better in both instruction groups when there was a 
match between fonn at study and test (pictures at study and test, or words at study and 
test) than when there was a mismatch (pictures at study and words at test, or words at 
study and pictures at test). This is similar to other findings that a match between form at 
study and test decreases responses latencies (e.g., Emmerich & Ackerman, 1979; 
Sternberg et al., 1995) and increases recognition (e.g., Mintzer & Snodgrass, 1999). This 
result is also consistent with encoding specificity (Tulving & Thomson, 1973) and 
transfer appropriate processing (Morris et al., 1977; Weldon et al., 1989) explanations o f 
memory, which emphasize the importance o f the similarity between encoding and 
retrieval processes for maxim izing  retrieval success. According to these theories, 
memory performance will be better when there is a match between cues at study and test. 
In the present experiment, there was a greater match between study and test cues when 
the form at study and test was the same (i.e., the picture-picture and word-word 
conditions) rather than different (i.e., the picture-word and word-picture conditions); thus, 
recognition was better in the picture-picture and word-word (rather than the picture-word 
and word-picture) conditions.
More importantly, the interaction between study and test form was similar in size 
for pictures and words, if  not larger for words—the mean increase in recognition 
performance in the word-word (relative to the word-picture) condition was .105, as
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compared to .053 in the picture-picture (relative to the picture-word) condition. This 
finding is consistent with Emmerich and Ackerman (1979), who found a similar increase 
in recognition performance for picture-picture and word-word conditions relative to 
picture-word and word-picture conditions, respectively. This suggests that pictures do not 
provide more or “better” cues to benefit retrieval than words. However, these results are 
inconsistent with findings that pictures are more sensitive to changes in visual form than 
words (Kolers et al., 1985), and are not easily interpreted within either encoding 
specificity (Tulving & Thomson, 1973) or transfer appropriate processing (Morris et al., 
1977; Weldon et al., 1989) fiameworks. Specifically, study pictures are assumed to be 
recognized better than study words because pictures provide more or “better” information 
than words at encoding. Thus, both transfer appropriate processing and encoding 
specificity would appear to predict that a pictorial encoding advantage (i.e., main effect 
o f pictures at study) would lead to a greater study by test interaction for pictures than 
words, because pictures at test should also provide more and “better” retrieval cues for 
pictures than words at test, than words at test provide retrieval cues for words.
Third, no main effect o f test form was found in recognition responses. That is, in 
both the question and no question groups, there was no overall difference in recognition 
performance using pictures or words at test Thus, the superiority o f pictures over words 
was limited to the study form. Again, such a result is not easily interpreted within either 
encoding specificity (Tulving & Thomson, 1973) or transfer appropriate processing 
(Morris et al., 1977; Weldon et al., 1989) accounts o f memory processing. There is no a 
priori reason to assume that the advantage o f pictures is true of study encoding only, 
while encoding at test leads to similar retrieval cue strength for pictures and words. Both
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transfer appropriate processing and encoding specificity appear to predict that, by 
providing a better study/test match for these “superior” cues, pictures at test should 
produce better recognition.
Fourth, an interaction between study instructions and question context, where 
congruent questions benefited both pictures and words, while incongruent questions had 
no effect, was found in recognition responses. That is, this interaction reflected the fact 
that 1) the congruent condition in the question group increased recognition o f both 
pictures and words relative to the incongruent question group, while 2) the incongruent 
condition in the question group had no effect on recognition relative to the no_question 
group. The latter finding is inconsistent with arguments that incongruent meaning can 
disrupt meaning elaboration for pictures and not words (Intraub & Nicklos, 1985; Smith 
& Magee, 1980). Intraub and Nicklos (1985) argued that semantic processing is 
“automatically initiated” for pictures and not words. Based on this notion, it was 
hypothesized that, in the present experiment, incongruent meaning questions would 
disrupt “automatically initiated” meaning encoding (and thus decrease memory 
performance) for pictures and not words. The finding that the incongruent condition in 
the question group had no effect on recognition relative to the no question group is 
inconsistent with this hypothesis. That is, contrary to predictions, there was no negative 
benefit (or cost) o f encoding incongruent meaning for pictures or words. This finding, as 
well as the finding that congruent questions increased recognition o f both pictures and 
words, are also in contrast with Hayman and Dew’s (1997) observations that encoding 
congruent meaning facilitated recognition for “read” conditions only and had no effect 
for “generate” conditions, while encoding incongruent meaning reduced the advantage of
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the “generate” condition and had no effect on the “read.” effects. It appears therefore, 
that different mechanisms underlie the picture superiority (Paivio, 1971) and generation 
(Slamecka & Graf, 1978) effects.
Fifth, relative to the no_questions group, there was a reduction in the size o f the 
picture superiority effect with congruent questions in the question group for recognition 
responses. That is, the advantage o f study picture over study word was smaller with 
congruent questions in the question than in the no question group (picture/word 
differences o f .082 and .236, respectively) and was smaller with congruent questions than 
incongruent questions in the question group (picture/word differences of .082 and .173, 
respectively). Thus, with recognition responses, there was support for the hypothesis that 
increased elaboration o f meaning at study would facilitate memory for words more than 
for pictures, thus reducing the picture superiority effect. This finding is similar to Grady 
et al. (1998), who observed a nonsignificant reduction o f picture superiority following 
similar levels o f picture/word meaning elaboration. However, the small but significant 
picture superiority effect observed in the present experiment is inconsistent with past 
observations that picture superiority in recognition can be eliminated (or even reversed) 
by encouraging similar levels of picture/word meaning elaboration (e.g., Durso &
Johnson, 1980; Emmerich & Ackerman, 1979). For example, Durso and Johnson (1980) 
reported a failure to find the picture superiority effect following presentations o f 
“function” questions (i.e., “What is the object used for?”), and reported a reversal o f  the 
picture superiority effect (i.e., a word superiority effect) following “explicit imagery” 
questions (i.e., “Create an image”). Similarly, Emmerich and Ackerman (1979), using 
response latencies as their dependent variable, reported a failure to find the picture
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superiority effect following presentations o f “conceptual” questions (e.g., “Does it unlock 
things” for a KEY). The inconsistency between the present and past studies may be due 
to some or all o f  the following: 1) compression o f effects due to near ceiling levels o f 
recognition performance in Durso and Johnson’s (1980) and Emmerich and Ackerman’s 
(1979) studies, 2) the absence o f a control for study/test form interactions in Durso and 
Johnson’s (1980) study, and 3) the use o f nonstandardized picture/word stimuli in Durso 
and Johnson’s (1980) and Emmerich and Ackerman’s (1979) studies. These possibilities 
will be discussed in the following paragraphs.
As discussed in the introduction, one o f the problems o f past studies was near 
ceiling levels o f recognition performance. For example, in Emmerich and Ackerman’s
(1979) study, recognition in the “conceptual” questions condition was near ceiling (91% 
and 93% for pictures and words, respectively). Because recognition in the control 
condition (where no orienting questions were presented) was also near ceiling for pictures 
(90% recognition, as compared to 82% for words), additional benefit to pictures due to 
meaning elaboration would have been more difficult to detect. This possibility may have 
existed in studies that did not have a control group. For example, Durso and Johnson
(1980) manipulated study-orienting questions in all conditions and found that recognition 
was at ceiling in both the “function” (93% for both pictures and words) and “explicit 
imagery” (91% and 95% for pictures and words, respectively) conditions. However, 
because the study had no control group, they could not evaluate whether the addition of 
meaning elaboration had a similar effect for pictures and words, which was one of the 
questions investigated in the present experiment More critically, they could not rule out
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the possibility that picture recognition would have been at ceiling without meaning 
elaboration.
It is also possible that ceiling effects can lead to a failure to observe the picture 
superiority effect To decrease the chance that ceiling effects would “cloud” the results of 
the present study, a lengthy “filler task” and several “recency buffers” were included in 
the design to increase the interval between study and test and (hopefully) reduce overall 
recognition performance. These manipulations were somewhat successful. Specifically, 
in the no_question condition of the present experiment, recognition was at 83% and 60% 
for pictures and words, respectively, as compared to 90% and 82% in Emmerich and 
Ackerman’s (1979) study. However, near ceiling levels of performance were observed 
for congruent questions in the questions group. Specifically, in the condition o f  the 
present experiment that is comparable to Durso and Johnson’s (1980) “function” 
condition (congruent context at study, words at test, recognition as the dependent 
variable), performance was near ceiling (95% and 89% for pictures and words, 
respectively), and similar to the levels reported by Durso and Johnson (i.e., 93% for both 
pictures and words). Thus, because the high levels o f recognition observed in the present 
experiment were similar to those reported by Durso and Johnson (1980) and Emmerich 
and Ackerman (1979), we cannot conclude that the elimination of the picture superiority 
effect observed in their studies was due simply to compression of effects due to ceiling 
levels o f performance.
While it is apparent that ceiling effects could cause a reduction of the picture 
superiority effect, there are reasons to doubt that this occurred in the congruent questions 
condition o f the present experiment. In an analysis where the top half o f the subjects in
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recognition performance were removed from the instruction groups, there was still a 
significant interaction between study form and study instructions, F (l, 43) = 5.98, MSc — 
.02, where the study advantage of pictures over words in the nojquestions group (mean 
difference o f .29) was reduced in the questions group (mean difference of .18). Yet in 
another analysis, which removed any subject who had a ceiling levels o f recognition in 
any o f  the four study conditions (leaving 12 and 16 subjects in the no questions, picture 
and word at test, groups, and 8 and 8 subjects in the questions, picture and word at test, 
groups), there was still a reliable interaction between study form and study instructions, 
F (l, 40) = 5.66, MSc — 02, where the study advantage o f pictures over words observed in 
the no_questions group was reduced in the questions group (mean differences o f  .25 and 
.15, respectively, as compared to .24 and .13 when all subjects were included). In short, 
removal o f subjects who had high recognition rates did not remove the interaction 
between study form and study instructions. Thus, by inference, there is no convincing 
evidence that the reduction in the picture superiority effect observed in the congruent 
questions condition o f the present experiment was a direct artifact of ceiling levels of 
performance in recognition.
A second possible reason that the picture superiority effect could appear to be 
eliminated (or even reversed) following meaning elaboration is the lack of a control for 
study/test form interactions with words. Such a result can occur if pictures and words are 
manipulated at study but not at test, with only words being used as retrieval stimuli at 
test. For example, Durso and Johnson (1980) tested recognition of studied pictures and 
words using only aurally-presented words, while Grady et al. (1998) used only visually- 
presented words at test. This is often done in an attempt to reduce recognition
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Accounting For Picture Superiority 59
performance and help avoid ceiling effects (Grady et al., 1998). However, in this 
situation, pictures at study are being tested with a different form o f test stimuli, while 
words are tested with the same form o f test stimuli. Thus, picture superiority effects are 
pitted against the study/test form interaction, which could potentially mask picture 
superiority. For example, in the present study, picture superiority at study was larger 
when pictures, rather than words, were used at test (means o f  .89 and .83, respectively).
In studies where only words at test are used therefore, we would expect the picture 
superiority effect to be reduced—with or without meaning elaboration—simply because 
the study/test form interaction (i.e., pictures and words at study, words only at test) could 
in part offset the advantage o f pictures over words. Thus, the interpretation o f results is 
ambiguous in studies that find a small and/or nonsignificant picture superiority effect 
following a manipulation o f study form and (aurally- or visually- presented) words only 
(e.g., Durso & Johnson, 1980; Grady et al., 1998).
The above analysis may also apply to studies that show a reduction, elimination, 
or reversal o f the picture superiority effect following meaning elaboration in recall. For 
example, studies have reported that “semantic processing,” (D’Agostino et al., 1977) 
“referential” tasks, and “explicit imagery tasks” (Durso & Johnson, 1980) eliminated the 
picture superiority effect in recall. However, recall tests can also present a study/test 
form interaction that might counteract the picture superiority effect because it involves 
the self-generation of retrieval cues. Specifically, i f  one were inclined to self-generate 
verbal (rather than pictorial) cues, there would be a match between encoding and retrieval 
cues for words (rather than pictures) that would counteract picture superiority in a  
manner similar to the word-word condition o f a recognition test.
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A third reason—in conjunction with the preceding argument—that the picture 
superiority effect could appear to be eliminated (or reversed) is the type o f stimuli used as 
pictures. The stimuli used in the present experiment were taken from Snodgrass and 
Vanderwart’s (1980) standardized set o f  black and white line drawings. The pictures 
have been standardized on four variables o f  central relevance to memory and cognitive 
processing; name agreement, image agreement, familiarity, and visual complexity.
Studies which have failed to find a picture superiority effect have used materials that 
were less thoroughly evaluated and normed (e.g., they used pictures that were hand 
drawn by the authors using a felt tip pen and not extensively judged for name or image 
agreement; Durso & Johnson, 1980; Emmerich & Ackerman, 1979). It is possible that 
pictures that are not consistently identified will lead to a smaller picture superiority 
effect. A smaller picture superiority effect would, in turn, be more easily masked or 
hidden by other effects, such as the study/test form interaction discussed earlier.
Source Identification
With one exception, source identification responses were affected by the same 
experimental manipulations as recognition responses. Thus, as in recognition, source 
identification responses showed: 1) a main effect o f study form (i.e., a picture superiority 
effect), 2) an interaction between study and test form which was similar in size for 
pictures and words, 3) no main effect o f  test form, and 4) an interaction between study 
instructions and question context, where congruent questions benefited memory for both 
pictures and words, while incongruent questions had no effect in the question group. 
However, source identification responses differed from recognition responses in one 
important way: unlike in recognition, there was no significant reduction o f the picture
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superiority effect in the congruent question condition. That is, the advantage o f study 
picture over study word in source identification was similar with congruent questions in 
the question and the no question groups (picture/word differences o f .174 and .221, 
respectively), and was similar with congruent questions and incongruent questions in the 
question group (picture/word differences o f .174 and .206, respectively). Thus, unlike 
recognition, source identification results were inconsistent with the hypothesis that 
increased elaboration of meaning at study would facilitate memory for words more than 
for pictures, thus reducing the picture superiority effect. These results are consistent with 
Durso and Johnson (1980), who also found an advantage of study pictures over study 
words (means o f .88 and .74, respectively) with source identification following their six 
“referential” tasks.
Remember
With one exception, remember responses were affected by the same experimental 
manipulations as recognition, and were the same as source identification responses.
Thus, remember results showed: 1) a main effect of study form (i.e., a picture superiority 
effect), 2) an interaction between study and test form which was similar in size for 
pictures and words, 3) no main effect o f test form, and 4) an interaction between study 
instructions and question context, where congruent questions benefited memory for both 
pictures and words, while incongruent questions had no effect. In terms o f the expected 
reduction o f the picture superiority effect in the congruent question condition, remember 
results essentially mirrored the pattern observed in source identification, rather than 
recognition, results. Specifically, like source identification but unlike recognition 
responses, the advantage of study picture over study word was similar with congruent
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questions in the question and the no question groups (picture/word differences o f .201 
and .200, respectively), and was similar with congruent questions and incongruent 
questions in the question group (picture/word differences o f .201 and .186, respectively). 
Thus, unlike recognition and like source identification results, remember results were 
inconsistent with the hypothesis that increased elaboration o f meaning at study would 
facilitate memory for words more than for pictures, thus reducing the picture superiority 
effect
The finding that remember and source identification responses were more similar 
to each other than to recognition responses is consistent with theories that see remember 
and source identification responses as relatively pure measures o f episodic memory (e.g., 
Conway & Dewhurst, 1994; Dewhurst & Conway, 1994; Dewhurst & Hitch, 1999; Rugg 
et al., 1998; Wilding & Rugg, 1996), while recognition responses are similar but also 
include familiarity information. That is, theorists have conceptualized remember 
responses as representing recollection (based on the conscious retrieval of a specific 
study episode) (e.g., Gardiner & Java, 1993; Rajaram, 1993; 1996, etc.). Because source 
memory is, by definition, “the ability to remember the context in which a particular piece 
of information has been learned", (Rybash, et al., 1995, p. 112), we would expect 
behavioural results in source and remember responses to be similar, which is what 
occurred in the present experiment.
In contrast to remember and source responses, which appear to be pure measures 
o f recollective experience (i.e., episodic memory), recognition responses are often 
hypothesized to be a composite o f recollection and familiarity (Dewhurst & Hitch, 1999; 
Gardiner & Java, 1993; Rajaram, 1993; 1996). The finding that there was a reduction o f
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the picture superiority effect in the congruent question condition (thus supporting the 
hypothesis that increased elaboration o f meaning would facilitate memory for words 
more than for pictures) for recognition responses and not for remember or source 
identification responses suggests that picture/word differences in familiarity are 
supported by our manipulation o f meaning, while picture/word differences in recollection 
are n o t Durso and Johnson’s (1980) results may also reflect the influence of familiarity 
in recognition—they found that meaning elaboration eliminated the picture superiority 
effect with recognition responses, but not source identification responses. Therefore, 
their recognition judgements could have reflected familiarity more than retrieval o f  a 
specific episode.
Evidence that picture/word differences in familiarity may be modified by 
manipulation o f meaning may be evaluated by examining know responses, such as those 
used in the present experiment. If  there is a dissociation between know results and 
remember/source results (i.e., know results show a reduction [or elimination] o f the 
picture superiority effect in the congruent condition), the notion that our manipulation of 
meaning affected familiarity, but not recollection, is supported.
Observed Know
The observed know responses showed a pattern completely different fi-om 
recognition, source identification, and remember responses. There was only one 
significant effect—a three-way interaction between instructions, study form and question 
context, which reflected a reversal o f the picture superiority effect with congruent 
questions in the question group. Specifically, unlike recognition, source identification, 
and remember responses, memory for study words (mean = .339) was better than study
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pictures (mean =  .219) in the congruent question condition.
The finding that a main effect o f study for pictures was observed in remember but 
not know responses partially replicate Rajaram’s (1993) finding o f opposite picture/word 
memory performance in remember and observed know responses (i.e., she found picture 
superiority in remember responses and word superiority in observed know responses) and 
is consistent with evidence suggesting a dissociation between remember/know 
phenomena (e.g., Gardiner, 1998; Gardiner & Parkin, 1990; Macken & Hampson, 1991, 
Rajaram, 1993; 1996).
The anomalies in the observed know results (e.g., an absence o f an effect o f 
instructions and question context, no interaction between test form and study form, etc), 
raise questions about how to interpret the observed know responses. Simply analyzing 
observed know responses assumes that the relationship between remember and know 
memory processes is one of perfect negative dependence (r = -1.00). This might be true 
if  remember and know responses are nonoverlapping areas in the same distribution 
(Donaldson, 1996), but if  remember and know responses are separate measures of 
memory (i.e., their relationship is one o f independence, r  = 0.00), then know responses 
must be adjusted for overlap with remember responses. This was done in the “estimated 
know” results that follow.
Estimated Probabilitv o f Know
In contrast to observed know responses, estimated know responses were affected 
by the same experimental manipulations as recognition, and with one exception, 
remember and source identification responses. That is, estimated know responses 
showed: 1) a main effect o f study form (i.e., a picture superiority effect), 2) an interaction
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between study and test form which was similar in size for pictures and words, 3) no main 
effect o f test form, and 4) an interaction between study instructions and question context, 
where congruent questions benefited memory for both pictures and words, while 
incongruent questions had no effect In terms o f the expected reduction of the picture 
superiority effect in the congruent question condition, estimated know results showed a 
similar pattern as recognition results, only the effect o f meaning elaboration was stronger. 
That is, the advantage o f  study picture over study word was smaller (in fact, slightly 
reversed) with congruent questions in the question than in the no question group 
(picture/word differences o f -.013 and .202, respectively) and was smaller with congruent 
questions than incongruent questions in the question group (picture/word differences o f  - 
.013 and .083). Thus, like recognition responses, estimated (assuming independence) 
know responses showed support for the hypothesis that increased elaboration o f meaning 
at study would facilitate memory for words more than for pictures.
Summary
In summary, an overall picture superiority effect was observed in all dependent 
variables (recognition, source identification, remember, estimated know responses) 
except observed know responses. The effect was reduced in the congruent questions 
condition for recognition and estimated know responses, but not for source identification 
and remember responses, suggesting that our manipulation o f meaning affected 
picture/word differences in familiarity, but not recollection.
Implications for Models o f Picture Superioritv
The following paragraphs will discuss the findings in terms o f their implications 
for other explanations o f the picture superiority effect—the dual-coding model o f Paivio
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(1971, 1986), and the sensory-semantic model o f  Nelson et al. (1977; Nelson, 1979). As 
discussed in the introduction, Paivio’s dual-coding model suggests two bases for the 
picture superiority effect: First, pictures are more likely to be coded in both the verbal 
and image code than words, and, second, the image code produces a stronger memory 
trace than the verbal code. Nelson et al.’s model attributes the picture superiority effect 
to the superior sensory code o f  pictures, which makes them more “visually distinctive” 
than words. Direct evidence for (or against) these theories are not provided by our 
results, since the purpose o f the present experiment was not to test specific predictions 
based upon them. However, in the context o f the theoretical debate regarding the basis 
for the picture superiority effect, one variable o f  interest in our study is the relative “form 
change costs" observed for stimuli studied in picture form and stimuli studied in word 
form (i.e., differences in performance between items studied and tested in the same and 
different form). Since both dual-coding and sensory-semantic theories assume modality- 
specific benefits for pictures (i.e., pictures have a unique perceptual advantage because of 
their ability to tap into the stronger image code [Paivio] or their superior sensory features 
[Nelson et al.]), these theories appear to predict a greater relative increase for picture- 
picture conditions than word-word conditions. Contrary to these predictions, we found 
no main effect of test form, and an interaction between study and test form that was 
similar in size for pictures and words; that is, the mean increase in recognition 
performance in the word-word (relative to the word-picture) condition was .105, as 
compared to .053 in the picture-picture (relative to the picture-word) condition. Thus, the 
present results tqipear to (indirectly at least) contradict the dual-code and sensory- 
semantic theories.
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Limitations o f  the Present Study and Suggestions for Future Studies
While our finding that the picture superiority effect in recognition was reduced 
(but not eliminated) was replicated internally (i.e., similar results were obtained for both 
picture and word test form groups and for both “high” and “low” recognition rates), 
strong conclusions cannot be made until the findings are replicated elsewhere. Durso and 
Johnson’s (1980) findings, that the picture superiority effect in recognition can be 
eliminated, were also replicated internally—they reported similar results using six 
different “referential” tasks and two different “imaginai” tasks, although all estimates o f 
picture superiority failed to account the interaction between study/test form. They also 
warned that picture/word memory results may differ depending on the semantic tasks 
used, and argued that: “Problems.. .may arise if  a researcher decides to use only one 
semantic orienting task or decides to consider a number o f  types o f semantic processing 
under the generic heading o f semantic” (p. 423). Recall that the orienting questions used 
in our experiment covered a lot o f areas (e.g., object animacy, function, physical 
descriptions, etc.) and ranged firom specific descriptions with obvious answers (e.g., 
“animal that barks?” for a dog) to those that were more ambiguous (e.g., “back and 
forth?” for a swing). The heterogeneity o f information covered by our semantic task may 
have lessened the chance we consistently tapped the encoding o f meaning relations that 
contribute to the picture superiority effect Consequently, it can be argued that our 
“diluted” semantic task was only able to reduce, but not eliminate, the picture superiority 
effect. This argument seems unlikely, since experiments that have used a variety of 
specific semantic tasks have reported little variance in their effectiveness (e.g., Durso & 
Johnson, 1980). Furthermore, this argument fails to explain why picture superiority in
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remember and source identification is ^parently  not affected by any semantic tasks. 
Despite this, future studies could investigate whether the present pattern o f  results hold 
up when different orienting tasks, including “imaginai” tasks (i.e., tasks which emphasize 
sensory information), are used.
Conclusion
The present study, which 1) took measures to control ceiling effects and assessed 
recognition at both “high” and “low” recognition rates, 2) included a manipulation of 
form at both study and test, and 3) used standardized picture and word materials, suggests 
that when potential confounds are controlled, the picture superiority effect in recognition 
is ubiquitous and robust, even following similar levels of meaning elaboration. Past 
evidence for the hypothesis that meaning elaboration accounts for the picture superiority 
effect is largely indirect, such as demonstrations that pictures access meaning more 
readily than words (e.g.. Potter & Faulconer, 1975; Smith & Magee, 1980), and findings 
that semantically processed pictures and words activate similar brain areas (Grady et al., 
1998). Therefore, there is no direct evidence that differences in meaning elaboration 
underlie the picture superiority effect.
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Appendix A
Remember/Know Test Instructions
You will be presented with pictures or words on the computer screen. As each 
picture or word appears, you will have to consider i f  you recognize it as having appeared 
in the study condition. If  you recognize it you will then indicate, using the computer, 
whether or not you “REMEMBER” it from the previous list or just “KNOW” on some 
other basis that you saw it during the study condition. Additionally, you may indicate that 
you do not recognize the picture or word by responding “NOT studied as picture or 
word.”
Each picture or word will be presented one at a time along with the following 
options:
1) Remember Picture from study session
2) Remember Word from study session
3) Know Picture (or similar one) was studied
4) Know Word (or similar one) was studied
5) Not studied as picture or word
* Note that the questions are asking you to indicate the form (picture or word) that you 
think the concept was presented in. For example, if  you remember seeing a picture o f  a 
“tree” during the study session and now see the word, “tree,” you would answer “ 1” or 
“3.”
Please read the following instructions to clarify how to make “REMEMBER”, 
“KNOW” and “NOT studied as picture or word” judgements.
Remember judgements: If  your recognition o f  the picture or word is accompanied 
by a conscious recollection o f its prior occurrence in the study manipulation, select a 
“REMEMBER” response (i.e., press (1) for “Remember Picture” or (2) for “Remember 
Word” on the keyboard). “REMEMBER” is the ability to become consciously aware o f 
some aspects o f  the initial experience when the picture or word was previously presented 
(e.g.,, aspects o f its physical appearance of the picture or word, a thought came to mind 
when you initially saw the picture or word, etc.).
Know judgements: I f  you recognize that the picture or word was presented during 
the study condition, but you cannot consciously recollect anything about its actual 
occurrence, select a “KNOW” response (i.e., press (3) for “Know Picture” or (4) for 
“Know word” on the keyboard). “KNOW” responses should be made when you are 
certain o f recognizing the picture or word but do not have a specific conscious 
recollection o f its occurrence in the study condition.
Not studied as picture or word: When you do not recognize the picture or word as 
appearing in the study list, you should indicate the number (5) for “Not studied as picture 
or word.”
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To further explain the difference between “remember” and “know” refer to these 
examples. If  someone asks you what your name is, you would respond in the “know” 
sense without being consciously aware o f anything about a particular event or experience. 
However, when asked what the name o f the last movie you saw was, you would most 
likely respond in the “remember” sense. That is, you are consciously aware o f some 
aspects o f  the previous experience. I f  you have any questions regarding these judgements 
feel free to ask the experimenter.
NOTE: THIS CAN BE A DIFFICULT TASK! WE DON’T  EXPECT YOU TO GET 
EVERYTHING RIGHT. JUST DO THE BEST YOU CAN.
Thank You.
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Footnotes
' Levels o f  processing proposes that focused attention to meaning information 
(“deep” levels o f processing) results in better memory than reliance on sensory 
information. Transfer appropriate processing, on the other hand, explains memory 
performance as a function of the similarity between encoding and retrieval tasks. That is, 
focusing on the meaning (rather than the sensory) characteristics o f an item will result in 
better memory performance for meaning tasks (and vice versa).
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Table 1
Mean Proportion o f Recognition Responses as a Function o f Study and Test Form. Study 
Instructions. Question Context and Colour
Stv<>yJiçtMS Sdn)y Words Nonstudied















































































































Note. Recognition responses = remember and know responses summed.
"For the no question group, question context (congruentfincongruent) was a pseudo-manipulation 
(only was presented).
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Accounting For Picture Superiority 84
Table 2
Mean Proportion o f Recognition Responses as a Function o f  Study and Test Form. Study
Instructions and Question Contact
study PipWft? Nonstudied
































































































Note. Recognition responses =  remember and know responses summed.
"For the no question group, question context (congruent/incongruent) was a pseudo-manipulation 
(only was presented).
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Tables
Mean Proportion o f  Remember Responses as a Function o f  Study and Test Form. Study 
Instructions and Question Context
Study Pictures Study Words
































.600 .550 .314 .013
SE (.051) (.065) (.071) (.047) (.068)
Test Words 
M .658 .400 .519 .314 025
SE (.070) (.046) (.062) (.052) (.015)
Total
No (Question 
M .518 .532 318 .308 .049
SE (.043) (.040) (.030) (.036) (016)
Question
M .736 .500 .535 .314 .019
SE (.045) (.043) (.046) (.035) (.083)
Total
M
SE 627 .516 .426 .311 .034
(.033) (.029) (.030) (.025) (.092)
Note. Remember responses = remember picture and remember word responses summed.
"For the no question group, question context (congruentrincongruent) was a pseudo-manipulation 
(only “***♦***” was presented).
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Table 4



































































































Note. Observed know responses = know picture and know word responses summed.
"For the no question group, question context (congruent/incongruent) was a pseudo-manipulation 
(only was presented).
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Tables







































M .662 .586 .662 .385 .107
SE (.110) (.072) (.078) (.057) (.033)
N 14 18 18 18
Test Words
M .670 .585 .714 .581 .116
SE (.084) (.062) (-063) (.048) (023)
N 17 18 18 18
Total
N oQ uestion
M .592 .638 .434 .392 .141
SE (.044) (.044) (.039) (.035) (.022)
N 36 36 36 36
Question
M .681 .586 .688 .483 111
SE (.065) (.047) (050) (.040) (.020)
N 31 36 36 36
Total
M .633 .612 561 .437 .126
SE (.040) (.032) (035) (.027) (015)
N 67 72 72 72 72
Note. Estimated probability o f know responses =  (frequency know/N) 
remember).
"For the no question group, question context (congruentfincongruent) 
(only was presented).
/  (1-probability o f
was a pseudo-manipulation
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Table 6
Mean Source Identification Responses as a Function o f  Study and Test Form. Studv Instructions 
and Question Context
Studv Pictures Studv Words Nonstudied













































































































Note. Source identification responses = remember picture and know picture responses summed fisr 
studied pictures and remember word and know word responses summed for studied words.
* The picture and word distinction for nonstudied items refers to the responses to these items, not 
the type of stimuli presented (i.e., pics = remember + know pictures; words = remember + know 
words).
'For the no question group, question context (congruentrincongruent) was a pseudo-manipulation 
(only was presented).
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Table?
Mean Proportion o f Incidental Colour Recognition Responses as a Function o f  Studv and Test
89


















































































































Note T o r the no question group, question context (congruentrincongruent) was a pseudo- 
manipulation (only “*****•*” was presented).
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Tables
Mean Corrected (Studied -  Nonstudied) Proportion o f Incidental Colour Recognition Responses as 
a Function o f Studv and Test FomL Instructions. Question Context and Colour
Studv Pictures Studv Words































































































"For the nojquestion group, question context (congruentrincongruent) was a pseudo-manipulation 
(only was presented).
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